Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

2002

Persuasion and Resistance: The Use of Psychology
by Anglo-American Corporate Governance
Advocate in France
James A. Fanto
Brooklyn Law School, james.fanto@brooklaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Other
Law Commons
Recommended Citation
35 Van. J. Transnat'l L. 1041 (2002)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

Persuasion and Resistance: The Use of
Anglo-American
by
Psychology
Corporate Governance Advocates in
France
JamesA. Fanto*
ABSTRACT

The Author argues that in the 1990s Anglo-American
corporate governance became the dominant model for large,
public firms in the international business world, and that
corporate governance professionals relentlessly promoted and
exported Anglo-American corporate governance throughout the
developed and developing world. Contending that it is an
appropriate time-if only because the U.S. recession and
international hostilities have tempered the "irrational
exuberance" of capital market proponents-to examine critically
the advocacy of Anglo-American corporate governance, the
Author proposes that an important part of the critical
assessment is to explain the momentum of the dominant model:
to understand why Anglo-American corporate governance
appeared so persuasive and inevitable, and why other models
were less compelling and pushed to the margins of the debate.
The Author argues that corporate governance advocates used
psychological factors to create this momentum.
The Author bases his argument upon a study of how
corporate governance advocates used psychological factors in
public texts, French and non-French, influential in recent
French corporategovernance debates to make a psychologically
persuasive case for the Anglo-American model. After presenting
the results of the study, the Author explains that the study
shows -that there is a need for policymakers to develop a better,
more rational way of debating about corporate finance and
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governance, in light of this pervasive use of the psychological
factors by governance advocates. After offering a few general
guidelines on how to achieve this goal, the Author argues that,
because its development will take time, culture and politics give
policymakers a mental framework that blunts the immediate
effects of the psychological factors and that guaranteesfor them
and others a space for debate on governance changes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, I studied corporate governance in world-class
French companies.' In the studies, I explained how a governance
system suitable for French State and family ownership of firms
partially evolved, or should evolve, to market capitalism. Looking
back at this work now, I believe that in it I participated in a
dominant advocacy movement regarding the oversight and
management of large publicly-owned firms.
The animating idea of the movement was that there is a basic
model of corporate governance that countries should promote, and
that firms should adopt, because it is most suitable for current
economic circumstances and is most likely to generate economic
growth. Under, the model, institutional shareholders such as pension
funds and small retail investors are the main owners of a firm, and
they leave its operations to technocratic management. 2 The main
difficulty in the relationship between owners and management, which
is the subject of corporate governance, is the well-known agency
3
problem-that managers act primarily in the shareholders' interests.
The model also assumes that firms raise capital in large, liquid
securities markets. 4 Investors have liquidity for their investments
and numerous investment choices, and firms can raise low-cost
capital. 5 Capital markets, moreover, provide firms with different

1.
See, e.g., JAMES A. FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND
FRENCH LAw (1997); James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French. Corporate
Governance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995);
James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French Enterprises,
1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 97; James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French
Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 31 (1998).
2.
See Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance,
supra note 1, at 36-39 (describing growing separation between management and
shareholders).
The agency problem is by now standard in the corporate finance and
3.
governance literature. For a seminal article, see Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
4.
See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany,
Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1959 (1993) (describing the role of
liquid securities markets in this economic model).
5.
That is, because of the liquidity provided by capital markets, investors do
not demand ex ante an additional return from a firm for their inability easily to resell
their investments. In other words, investors do not demand a discount from the firm to
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kinds of financing, rather than compelling them to look to few capital
providers, such as banks or other large financial institutions, for their
financing needs.
The model also has a political basis. This method of corporate
finance is presented as more democratic and less paternalistic than
its alternatives. Investors' freedom to choose among different kinds
of investments is tied to a debate about pensions:6 just as ordinary
people are encouraged to take charge of and be educated concerning
their investments, they should similarly control their retirement
assets and not rely upon the state or the companies in which they
work. 7 The freedom of self-directed pensions is contrasted with the
paternalism of state-directed pension systems, where few officials8
make decisions and people are generally passive and dependent.
Under the model, a firm need not convince state officials or bankers9
in large financial institutions about its worthiness for financing.
Rather, any firm could test its value by offering its securities on
liquid capital markets, with the implication that there will be
investors ready to invest in any worthy firm. From a practical
political perspective, the model reflects the kind of capitalism
prevalent in the United States, which was the most dynamic
The largest institutional investors,
superpower in the 1990s.
generally from the United States and the United Kingdom, which has
a market capitalism system similar to that of the United States,
increasingly invest their funds throughout the world 10 and desire to
see their governance model employed by firms in other countries.
As a further justification, the dominant movement espouses both
an economic and philosophical liberalism and condemns liberalism's

compensate for this risk. Accordingly, a firm can raise more capital from investors.
Id.
6.
See James A. Fanto, Comparative Investor Education, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
1083, 1083-85 (1998); James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities Disclosure, and
the Creation and Enforcement of CorporateGovernance and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U.

L. REV. 15, 18-19, 31-32, 39 n.93 (1998); James A. Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now:
The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 105 (1998).
7.
See Fanto, We're All CapitalistsNow, supra note 6, at 118-26.
8.
The self-directed pension also has an economic justification: it is seen as a
necessity for ordinary people because neither firms nor the State can any longer
finance the retirement burden of a growing retiree population. Moreover, firms in
countries mandating company sponsorship of generous retirement benefits would bear
more retirement costs and would thus underperform firms in countries with a marketSee E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME
based retirement.
SECURITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 5-26, 42-47 (1997).

9.
See Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and
the United States, supra note 4, at 1959 ("[A]s debt securities, commercial paper and
bonds replace bank loans, so commercial banks' influence as lender declines.").
10.
Cf. Magnus Dahlquist & Goran Robertsson, Direct Foreign Ownership,
Institutional Investors, and Firm Characteristics,59 J. FIN. ECON. 413, 435-39 (2001)
(describing institutional investor participation in Swedish firms).
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opponents.
Economic liberalism accepts that individuals acting
within the market are generally best suited to decide on the
distribution of financing and the production of economic resources."
In Western countries, this economic liberalism goes hand in hand
12
with the individual freedom espoused by philosophical liberalism.
The movement characterizes any opposition to liberalism as being
authoritarian or paternalistic, and it derides non-market systems,
such as socialism and communism.1 3 The discourse naturally regards
religion with skepticism, finding that certain religions, such as
14
Catholicism and Islam, are authoritarian and anti-liberal.
According to the dominant movement, these religious undermine
commercial growth and are hostile to capital markets. 15
Indeed, there were and continue to be thoughtful academic
criticisms of the dominant discourse, which will be discussed below.
Yet even these perspectives that identify the value of other kinds of
corporate finance and governance often suggest, either explicitly or
implicitly, that there is little justification for resistance to market
capitalism. 16 The almost uniform message is that Anglo-American

11.
See, e.g., F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 36 (1944) ("The liberal
argument is in favor of making the best possible use of the forces of competition as a
means of co-ordinating human efforts, not an argument for leaving things just as they
are. It is based on the conviction that, where effective competition can be created, it is
a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other.").
12.
In practice, the two went together. The interesting question is whether
they in fact must go together. See DEEPAK LAL, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE
IMPACT OF FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, CULTURE, AND POLITICS ON LONG-RUN ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 86-94 (1998). Lal offers an explanation of the origins of Western
individualism that is based upon an effort by the Catholic hierarchy to separate the
individual from the family and his or her immediate society, so as to make the
individual more inclined to follow the hierarchy, and explains that this kind of
individualism need not accompany the modern finance that developed in Western
countries. Id.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
13.
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (2001)
(describing Mark Roe's position that strong securities markets are inconsistent with
"social democracies"); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership
from CorporateControl, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 541 (2000).
14.
Ren6 M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, at 2-5
(Mar. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (presenting data that Protestant
countries give better creditor rights, but not necessarily better shareholder rights, than
Catholic countries).
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 13, at 56-58, 71-74 (arguing, with a
15.
rudimentary kind of historical analysis, that "private ordering," so essential for
commercial growth, occurred only in the United States, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom (i.e., Protestant countries), in contrast to State-dominated,
hierarchical societies); Stulz & Williamson, supranote 14, at 5.
16.
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 13, at 91; Raguram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The
Great Reversals: The Politics of FinancialDevelopment in the 20th Century, at 40 (Mar.
(arguing that market
2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/papersW8178
capitalism may well spread, although its dominance is not inevitable).
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corporate governance will inevitably extend throughout the developed
17
and much of the industrialized world, barring political catastrophes.
This Article offers one possible explanation for the force of the
dominant movement: its advocates, who urged corporate governance
changes in countries outside the United States and the United
Kingdom, used psychological techniques that made their message
particularly compelling. The debate over corporate governance in
many countries has not been one in which advocates and
policymakers rationally weighed the features of different corporate
governance systems and recommended the most suitable alternative
Debate over
depending on the circumstances of a country.
alternatives occurred. But, within this debate, corporate governance
advocates, whether consciously or not, used powerful psychological
techniques that gave force to their advocacy of the dominant model.
The use of psychology did not make the debate irrational, but rather
"quasi-rational,"-a term that is meant to convey how emotional and
8
mental limitations constrain the exercise of human rationality.'
Part II of this Article briefly describes how the dominant model
of corporate governance swept all those before it in the 1990s, both
outside and inside the academy. It also emphasizes how the force of
the model made its view of governance seem inevitable and
convincing. Part III argues that it is an appropriate time to examine
the model because of recent changes in world political and economic
circumstances which have raised doubts about the model. Part IV
sets forth the psychologically-based study of the Article. It first
briefly summarizes the orientation of behavioral law and economics
that inspired the study and identifies the major psychological factors
identified by research. It then presents a study that looks for
psychological factors in the major texts that are influential in recent
The Part proceeds by
French corporate governance debates.
providing a little background on French corporate governance to place
the study in context. Part V presents the results of the study by
highlighting the major differences between the French and nonFrench corporate governance advocacy texts in their use of
psychological factors. It then examines specific examples of how each
of the texts employs the factors.

See Bernard Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter. A Crude Test Using
17.
Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2138 (2001) (suggesting that corporate
governance differences matter little in developed countries (i.e., that there is no
correlation between economic performance and corporate governance reforms), but
matter a lot in developing countries, where there are few norms of commercial
Of course, political and other
behavior, securities laws, and corporate law).
catastrophes are unpredictable, as we have all seen in the September 11th terrorist
attacks and the ensuing biological terrorism in the United States.
18.

See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS, at xxi (1991).
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Finally, Part VI draws several conclusions from the study. First,

it argues that the study presents a new, psychologically-based
account of the recent French corporate governance debates. This
perspective implies that psychologically: powerful advocacy altered
the French corporate governance debate by pushing finance and
governance alternatives into the background. Second, this Part
contends that the advocacy did not promote a corporate finance and
governance solution that is politically acceptable in France and
addresses peculiarly French issues of corporate governance. Most
importantly, the study suggests that policymakers in countries that
are the object of aggressive corporate governance advocacy need to
develop a better, more rational way of discussing corporate
governance in light of the pervasive use of the psychological factors
directed at them. They need, in short, to counter the influence of the
psychological factors by developing a kind of comprehensive
rationality that will limit the effect of the factors on their policymaking. After offering -a few general guidelines on how to achieve
this rationality, the Part then argues that, because its development
will take time, culture and politics may give policymakers a mental
framework that blunts the immediate effects of the psychological
factors and that guarantees for them and others a space for debate on
finance and governance changes. Part VI concludes by arguing that a
recent French law dealing with corporate governance shows both the
success of Anglo-American corporate governance advocates-based on
the use of the psychological factors in the French corporate
governance debates-and the cultural and political resistance to them
by French policymakers.
Part VII concludes the Article by emphasizing the role of a
country's culture and politics in ensuring a rational debate about
corporate governance reform.
II. THE MOMENTUM OF THE DOMINANT DISCOURSE OF ANGLOAMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The dominant discourse that swept outside and inside the
academy was based on a U.S.-style corporate governance and market
capitalism. 19 In international business, there has been relentless
promotion and exportation of Anglo-American corporate finance,
governance, and legal systems. 20 This effort certainly occurred in

19.

FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 22

(2000).
20.

Id.
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France in the late 1990s, with U.S. shareholder activists and
institutional investors at the forefront. 21 I personally participated by
giving advice to government officials and others interested in
reforming French corporate law so that it would advance and promote
modern corporate governance. 22 The same advocacy characterized
corporate governance reform efforts in other European countries,
Asia, and the developing world. 23 As evidence of this reform, one has
only to reflect for a moment on the growth of shareholder activism
around the world and the formation of activist organizations that
were encouraged and funded by major U.S. shareholder activists and
pension funds.2 4 Shareholder activism became business, if not "big'
25
business.
Scholars in U.S. law and business schools exhibited a more
diverse and thoughtful reaction. However, the overall position, with
a few notable exceptions, was to argue that corporate governance
based upon a U.S. model should ultimately prevail, at least in
industrialized countries. 26
Committed supporters of market

21.
I described this activity in an earlier article.
See Fanto, The
Transformation of French Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 67-71; see also
Lauren J. Aste, Reforming French Corporate Governance: A Return to the Two-Tier
Board?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 3-9 (1999).
22.
This was really the purpose of FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW, supra note 1. The book, commissioned by the French
Association d'1tconomie Financi~re, an organization underwritten by the State-owned
Caisse des D6p6ts, was designed to contribute to the then ongoing debate within and
without government circles about French corporate governance. While Professor Roe
might call this kind of reform "technicar' because it concerns law reform, but does not
deal with the underlying politics or culture of corporate governance, these reforms
often indicate either that corporate governance in a country is changing or that there
exists pressure for it to change. See Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating
Ownership and Control, supra note 13, at 594-97.
23.
See Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and
Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United
States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 75 (1996).
24.
See Fanto, The Transformationof French Corporate Governance, supra note
1, at 18-22 (describing the activism); see also The International Corporate Governance
Network, at http://www.icgn.org (offering an example of worldwide corporate
governance activism). In France, the best example is Sophie L'H6lias, who began as a
lawyer for a U.S. law firm in France, then moved to a Belgian-based activist investor
group (Deminor). She next founded her own group, Franklin Associates, and has now
moved to the United States and founded L'H~lits Governance Advisors. She sits on the
Board of Governors of the International Corporate Governance Network [hereinafter
ICGN.
25.
See supra note 24. Again, the sponsors of the ICGN reflect the large
number of corporate governance activists. See http://www.icgn.org.
26.
The most prominent legal academics in this camp include (former
professor) Judge Easterbrook and Professors Jonathan Macey and Roberta Romano.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Macey & Miller, supra note 23; Roberta Romano, Corporate
Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277 (1996). Professor
Coffee also belongs in this camp, although he is more low-keyed in his advocacy, for he
clearly assumes that market capitalism is the ideal form of economic relations and
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capitalism are generally law and economics scholars who draw
27
support for their position from work in finance and economics.
Their approach, at base, reflects the view that because opportunism is
fundamental to human beings, individuals or groups capture
government to promote their self-interest, with the worst example
being a dictatorship. 28 From this perspective, market capitalism with
a democratic government of limited powers is the best system for
productive activity because it counters the human tendency to use the
government to further self-interest and encourages people to be
competitive in the market.29
Committed supporters of market capitalism often rely on
empirical work undertaken by financial economists that link a
country or region's economic performance to its corporate finance and
governance. 30 These financial economists present themselves as
agnostic because in their view they are attempting to find, in
accordance with the scientific methods of their discipline, correlations
between legal, political, and even cultural features on one hand, and
corporate governance and economic success on the other. 31 On the

argues that most developed countries are moving towards this capitalism. See Coffee,
supra note 13, at 92.
27.
See, e.g., Rene M. Stulz, Merton Miller's Contributionto Modern Finance,J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2001, at 8, 19 ("But Miller remained squarely in the camp
of those who argued that the U.S.-U.K. model of market capitalism is the most reliable
way of producing consistent economic growth.").
28.
See ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND:
GOVERNMENT PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 4 (1998) ("At the root of the grabbing
hand analysis are models of political behavior that argue that politicians do not
maximize social welfare and instead pursue their own selfish objectives.").
See
generally MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY 173-99 (2000) (describing
spontaneous and irrepressible markets, explaining the ubiquity of markets as a result
of human nature, and arguing for the importance of a political order to gains from
trade).
29.
The main weakness of a democracy is that, like every form of government,
it may be captured by the ever-present groups that pursue their own interests at the
expense of the greater good. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS:
ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 36-78 (1982).
30.
See, e.g., Ross Levine, Bank-Based or Market-Based FinancialSystems: Which
is Better?, (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/jfi/WDILevine.pdf
(describing the "law and finance" view of the question articulated by Rafael La Parta,
Florence Lopez de-Silanes, and Andre Shleifer).
31.
This work on correlations between corporate governance and economic
prosperity is important and must be addressed by any corporate governance scholar.
See Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World,
55 J. FIN. 1131 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World,
54 J. FIN. 471, 492 (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1143-48 (1997); Rafeal La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106
J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). For an overall summary of this work, and an
additional finding that law matters for the growth of a country's financial systems
(especially a law that can continually adapt to changes in economic reality), see
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basis of their empirical evidence, economists counsel policymakers to
create corporate governance rules that will improve the economic

well-being of their citizens by producing the highest wealth for the
country. 32 They generally conclude that market capitalism and its
33
governance form offer the best system for economic growth.

Academics, such as Professor Ronald Gilson, speak respectfully
about forms of finance and governance other than market capitalism,
yet consider that they are unsuited for large companies in today's
world economy. 3 4 Professor Gilson's basic message is that AngloAmerican finance and governance is appropriate for our historical
period.3 5
He understands that, because of "path dependent"
reasons-an evolutionary biological metaphor used to refer to
36
historical and cultural causes for a particular form of governance countries may not be able to adopt this system immediately. Instead,,
countries or individual companies must design solutions that
approximate market capitalism within the constraints of their own
37
systems.

Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Politics, and Finance, (Apr. 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com.
32.
See, e.g., James R. Barth et al., Choosing the Right Financial System For
Growth, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2001, at 116 (presenting data about different
countries' financial systems that are correlated with economic development); Thorsten
Beck et al., Finance and the Sources of Growth, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (2000) (presenting
data that the development of financial intermediaries in a country is positively
correlated with economic growth); Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and The
Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (2000) (presenting data that financial
markets improve capital allocation, thus targeting funds better to growing industries).
33.
See, e.g., Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Privatization and Corporate
Governance, at 22-23 (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/books/easel2/
johnson9-26-01.pdf ("We are not arguing that all countries could or should become just
like the United States.' But in important dimensions we see countries around the
world adopting investor protections measures that are modeled on US law. The
evidence suggests that when these measures are implemented in an enforceable way,
they can change both the extent of investor protection and the ability of firms to obtain
external finance.").
34.
See Ronald J. Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Efficiency: When
Do InstitutionsMatter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 331, 334 (1996).
35.
Id. at 334.
36.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence
in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127, 134 (1999) ("By path
dependent bases, we mean reasons arising from the different initial conditions with
which countries started.").
37.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of
Form or Function, (May 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (discussing the ways
in which convergence can occur by countries or firms finding the functional equivalent
of another system, by firms adopting by contract another system). Although Professor
Gilson never says that Anglo-American corporate governance is the best system, and
recognizes that it has been favored recently because of the economic strength of the
United States, all the examples he uses tend to show the U.S. system favorably (e.g., in
that paper, he extolls the strength of the U.S. venture capital industry). Id. at 4, 16-21.
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Related to Professor Gilson's approach and relying greatly upon
the perspective of path dependence, some scholars emphasize how
corporate finance and governance are strongly influenced by politics
and. culture. 38 Their message to policymakers is that governance
changes should occur carefully so as not to upset delicate political and
cultural balances.3 9 Professor Mark Roe takes a stronger position:
that some changes may be impossible within a given system. 40 In a
similar research project, Professor Amir Licht attempts to make
cultural determinants of corporate governance the object of rigorous
social scientific study. 41 . On the basis of social psychological work,
Professor Licht wants to establish an empirical relationship between
cultural factors and corporate governance in different countries so
that policymakers will understand the constraints within which they
42
can accomplish reforms.
Thus, there is now a rich debate in law and. finance about
whether the origins of corporate governance systems lie mainly in
legal systems, politics, or elsewhere. 43 The debate has two important
policy implications: (1) if the determining factor is law, then laws may
be changed to create the best governance; and (2) if politics or culture
is more important, then change is harder to bring about because
these determinants are not easily transformed. 44 The most

38.
See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213 (1999) (arguing that national systems of corporate
governance are complexly determined).
39.
Id. at 220-21.
40.
Mark Roe, the most renowned scholar in this political school, emphasizes
how macro politics have strongly determined corporate governance. See generally
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). Recently, he has argued that the large public firm is
incompatible with European social democracies. In his view, because strong controlling
shareholders (generally families of the founder of the firm in question) cannot be sure
that unrelated managers will not be co-opted by government and labor pressures to act
in ways that are harmful to the owners, the shareholders maintain control of firms and
keep them entirely or largely away from capital markets. * See Roe, supra note 13, at
550. He does, however, speculate that European social democracies may be breaking
down in the worldwide economy, which would increase the number of public European
firms with diversified ownership and would expand market capitalism on that
continent. Id. at 600-03.
41.
See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward A CrossCultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001).
Id. at 149; see also Amir N. Licht et al., Culture, Law, and Finance:
42.
Cultural Dimensions of Corporate Governance Laws, (May 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com.
43.
For an excellent review of this literature (as of 1999), see Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 38.
44.
Yet another position (with which I am sympathetic) is that law matters, but
that it must be carefully transplanted from one context into another in order to be
effective. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the
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prominent financial economists, such as Andrei Shleifer, take an
opposing position to Professor Roe and argue that legal systems, not
politics and culture, have greatly determined governance outcomes. 45
In contrast, financial economists Rajuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales,
like law professor John Coffee, offer an interest group explanation for
the development of different corporate governance systems. 46 Their
explanation is a criticism of both political and cultural explanations,
as well the legal account. 47 Rajan and Zingales argue that in the
Great Depression that followed World War I, governments in Japan
and Germany teamed with banks to close down capital markets in
those countries in an effort to promote governance that centered
around characteristics of the bank, family, and state. 48 Market
capitalism and Anglo-American corporate governance may be
reintroduced in those countries now that have groups favorable to
49
them have emerged.
As the 1990s progressed, it became difficult to argue for a finance
and governance approach that was not based on Anglo-American
corporate governance. 50 Arguments not based on the Anglo-American
approach were not taken seriously outside the academy in governance
reform efforts around the world. 51
In fact, from a realistic
perspective, arguments against Anglo-American finance and
governance had little persuasive force.5 2 The political and economic

TransplantEffect, at 2 (Nov. 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com. In the article,
the authors argue:
For law to be effective, a demand for law must exist so that the law on the
books will actually be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for
developing the law are responsive to this demand. If the transplant adapted
the law to local conditions, or had a population that was already familiar with
basic legal principles of the transplanted law, then we would expect that the
law would be used. Because the law would be used, a strong public demand for
institutions to enforce this law would follow. And, legal intermediaries that are
responsible for developing and enforcing this imported law would be able to
develop the law so at [sic] to match demand, because the strong demand for law
would provide resources for legal change.
Id.
45.
See SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 28.
46.
See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 16, at 12, 34-38 (arguing that the
existence of vigorous capital markets in many pre-World War I civil law European and
Asian countries demonstrates that neither law nor politics had much to do with the
kind of corporate governance of these countries).
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 34-35.
49.
Id. at 37-40.
50.
See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 19, at 5-6.
51.
Id. at 22 ("By historical accident, much of the academic research on
financial systems has been undertaken in the United States and United Kingdom.
This has perhaps led to a bias toward market systems.").
52.
This is one of the effects of the dominant movement's momentum. See infra
Part III.
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demise of Communist countries and the privatization of former state
industries in those countries and elsewhere around the world were
visible signs of the worldwide preference for Anglo-American
corporate governance. 58 These historical events argued for a modern
governance that, valued private enterprise ownership and promoted
54
popular participation in capital markets.

III.

EXPLAINING THE MOMENTUM

Critically examining the recent advocacy of Anglo-American
finance and governance is appropriate for a number or reasons.
"Irrational exuberance" about ever growing and expanding world
capital markets may be coming to an end, or at least to a thoughtful
pause. 55 Consciousness of market irrationality brought about by the
precipitous rise and fall of the NASDAQ, the dot.coms, and now
Enron, has undermined a ready faith in the markets and, potentially,
This perspective is
in Anglo-American corporate governance. 56
echoed by a growing literature in behavioral finance, which identifies
evidence of "quasi-rationality" in capital markets.5 7 In other words,
we are in a period when we are jarred out of settled expectation
because of unsteady markets, a recession, and terrorist events. 58 As a
result, we may have a better perspective from which to take stock of
Even the popular business
recent events and circumstances. 59

53.
See William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A
Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization,39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 323-29 (2001). It is
interesting, however, that available empirical data does not show either widespread
See Tarun Khanna et al.,
legal or functional convergence to a U.S. model.

Globalization and Corporate Governance Convergence? A Cross-Country Analysis, at 4
(Oct. 30, 2001), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/clb/Khanna.pdf. (finding only
convergence in form among pairs of countries with interlinked economic systems
(excluding the United States in the pair analysis)).
54.
See OLSON, supra note 29, at 155-71. On the taking of a market approach
in Eastern Europe, see generally Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of CorporateLaw, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996).
55.
See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000)
(expanding on the term used by Alan Greenspan in a 1996 speech).
56.
Id. at 209-10.
57.
See generally HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (2000) (describing the

impact of psychological forces on investor interaction with the market); ANDREI
SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000);

David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing,56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001); Hersh
Shefrin, Behavioral CorporateFinance,J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 113.
58.
See SHILLER, supra note 55, at 210 (describing the possibility of this
occurrence).
59.
From a behavioral perspective, it may be only when an event "shocks"
people out of their customary viewpoint that they understand the limitations of the
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press-those that helped create the bandwagon for market
capitalism-now expresses concern about the equity culture's ability
to continue in an economic downturn and in a potentially unsteady
60
worldwide political climate.
Moreover, the United States-the paradigm of Anglo-American
corporate governance-has not recently presented an entirely
attractive picture of economic life-a fact that also weighs in favor of
arresting the recent momentum. 6 1 Astronomical riches abound for
some, such as CEOs, investment bankers, and their lawyers, while
low wages abound for others, and the failure of corporate and
securities laws to address the disparity is apparent.6 2 Previously
unthinkable levels of consumption have become acceptable, although
there are warnings that this acceptance may have undermined the
stability of our social order; we have produced an arms race in
63
consumption with little in the way of growing satisfaction from it.
We also cannot help but question the practicality and advisability of
exporting U.S. corporate finance and governance rules to other
cultures because the rules may not64 be in harmony with the belief
systems of people in other countries.
This Article does not argue for the extreme of condemning AngloAmerican finance and governance, which is what swept the academic,
and to some extent the business practitioner, world in the 1990s
recession. That was when many admired, and urged imitation of,
65
German and Japanese governance and business practices.
Furthermore, the Article does not argue that policymakers should not
and cannot rationally search for the best corporate governance

viewpoint. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 15-16 (1982).

See John Peet, Rise and Fall: A Survey of Global Equity Markets,
60.
ECONOMIST, May 5, 2001, at 50; Marcia Vickers et al., The Betrayed Investor, BUS. WK.,
Feb. 25, 2002, at 104.
61.

See generally ROBERT H. FRANKS, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO

SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
62.
This income disparity has not particularly bothered many mainstream
legal scholars. For example, despite the lack of evidence that investment bankers
contribute justifiable value as advisors in mergers, cf. Anthony Saunders & Anand
Srinivasan, Investment Banking Relationships and Merger Fees, at 16-28 (Oct. 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com, Coffee has remained a steadfast apologist for them.
See Coffee, supra note 13, at 32-34.
See FRANKS, supra note 61.
63.
See LAL, supra note 12, at 173-78; see also Licht, Mother of All Path
64.
Dependencies, supra note 41, at 187-203 (arguing that it may be shown scientifically
that Anglo-American corporate governance may not work with the underlying cultural
On the other hand, one may conclude that corporate
factors of other cultures).
governance is part of a technological world that other cultures could adapt with little
effect on their deeper beliefs. See LAL, supra note 12, at 178.
65.
See La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra
note 31, at 17-18 (describing swings in academic fashion regarding the superiority of
corporate governance systems).

20021

PERSUASION AND RESISTANCE

1055

system for their country that might well include some reliance upon
and imitation of Anglo-American market capitalism. 66 Rather, this
Article will show how psychological factors were used to help create
the momentum and the resulting one-sidedness of recent corporate
finance and governance debates taking place in many countries. The
factors suppressed discussion and gave advocates of the new order
the appearance of correctness, persuasiveness, and inevitability,
which made the force of their arguments hard to resist. The exercise
of the factors prevented a completely rational discussion from
undermined the
occurring, pushed it to the margins, 6and
7
effectiveness of corporate governance debates.

IV. THE

STUDY

A. PsychologicalBackground
This Article examines how advocates used psychological factors
in significant documents that they employed to influence French
policymakers, company officials, investors, and academics to promote
the new governance order. The Article refers to psychological factors
such as biases and mental shortcuts that deflect or skew rational
thinking in individuals, thus making much of normal decisionmaking "quasi-rational. ' 68 These factors are identified by research in

Indeed, the desire to identify the best corporate governance system for
66.
promoting overall social wealth and to decide how to create it is the underlying reason
for the academic debate on corporate governance. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins, Law as
Bedrock: The Foundationsof an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies,
(Aug. 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (discussing the academic debate on the
origins of investor capitalism in the United States and the United Kingdom and the lessons
a policymaker can draw from business and legal history in these countries).
67.
In emphasizing a psychological and social psychological perspective on the
dominant discourse, I admit that other factors, both institutional and political, would
help account for the dominance of Anglo-American corporate finance and governance
advocacy, but I do not focus upon them. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic
Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238 (2001) (discussing academic fads). It is
hardly a surprise that Anglo-American corporate finance and governance were
dominant when U.K. and U.S. funds advocating market-based finance and governance
were the major cross-border investors in the world economy. See Dahlquist &
Robertsson, supra note 10, at 438-39 (noting that institutional investors, primarily of
U.S. origin, prefer to invest in large companies, with much liquidity and without
For example, French
controlling shareholders, resembling the U.S. model).
policymakers (the subject of a good part of the remaining article) repeatedly observe, as
a major factor in French debates about corporate governance, that they must take
account of the wishes of Anglo-American institutional investors with significant
investment in French markets and French companies. See infra Part V.B.
68.
See THALER, supra note 18, at xxi.
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the growing field of law and psychology, or broadly speaking, law and
69
human cognition.
The psychological approach in legal studies questions the
adequacy of the "rational choice" model. This model is from the
dominant law and economics perspective that views people as
rationally able to weigh alternatives, with a dispassionate cost/benefit
calculation, in making decisions or policies. 70
Much empirical
evidence suggests that people do not behave in ways established by
this model, which undermines the model's ability to predict behavior
for policy-making purposes. 71 Behavioral and psychological studies
have shown that there is a need for a different account of decisionmaking in order to explain and to predict how people in fact make
72
decisions and behave.
The psychological account offers a rich and realistic description
of the motives for, and the process of, human behavior and decisionmaking. The account helps an analyst predict human behavior and
form policies likely to modify and influence it. 7 3 The perspective

69.
See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed.,
2000); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057
(2000) (arguing for the incorporation of cognitive psychology, sociology, and other
behavioral sciences into the study of law); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories
of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1499 (1998) (reviewing the impact of behavioral psychology on legal literature);
Shira B. Lewin, Economics and Psychology: Lessons For Our Own Day From the Early
Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1293 (1996) (discussing the history of economics in
the 20th century and its simultaneous resistance to psychology and interest in
psychology at the expense of other social sciences). For a legal debate on the value of
the psychological approach, compare Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a
Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577
(1998) (contending that behavioral economics does not offer an adequate model
predictive of human behavior) and Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (arguing that rational choice
theory and evolutionary biology can explain many problems identified by behavioral
theory), with Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) and Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to
Posnerand Kelman, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (1998) (explaining the scientific foundations
of behavioral law and economics and the predictive force of the approach).
70.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1060-66 (for an explanation of
rational choice theory). See generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS
THAT MAKE US SMART 3-34 (1999) (describing heuristics as models of behavior for both
organisms and artificial systems, capturing how real minds make decisions under the
constraints of limited time and knowledge).
71.
Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998).
72.
Id.
73.
For comprehensive summaries of this account, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 69; Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law Economics,
supra note 69, at 1471-76; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1053-59; Langevoort,
supra note 69. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress
Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999).
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understands human behavior as emotional and impulsive, rather
than exclusively rational. 74 By their nature, people, in reacting
emotionally, often focus on the present and the short term, meaning
they are "myopic," and exclude the future.7 5 At times, people often
find
place inappropriate value on a present risk or attraction and
76
themselves either too preoccupied with it or unable to resist it.
The psychological approach also sees limitations on human
calculative rationality with one version of this approach using the
term "bounded rationality. '7 7 Psychological studies show that people
exhibit "biases" that prevent or distort rational calculation. 78 For
example, human beings react more strongly to losses than to gains.
In other words, people have an "aversion" to loss and a bias towards
the "status quo." 79 Individuals become attached to what they have,
and this is known as the "endowment effect."80 Under another bias,
people dislike extremes in decision-making. Therefore, people often
81
select a middle ground rather than one of the extremes.
Another bias that affects decision-making is self-confidence and
over-optimism. 8 2 People overestimate the statistical probability of an
outcome favorable to themselves and exaggerate their own chances or
abilities when deciding or taking any action.8 3 Under the "hindsight
bias," people feel that decisionmakers or policymakers in the past
should have predicted the outcome of their decision that was not
84
predictable given the information actually available at the time.
Accordingly, in decision or policy-making of all kinds, individuals act

See Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law Economics, supra note 69, at
74.
1476-77; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1059.
75.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1113-26 (discussing the power of
visceral cravings, myopia and focus on sunk costs); Sunstein, A ProgressReport, supra
note 73, at 122-23.
See generally STEVEN PINKER, How THE MIND WORKS 41-42 (1997)
76.
(demonstrating how a focus on the present makes sense from an evolutionary
perspective).
See, e.g., Sunstein, A Progress Report, supra note 73, at 131; see also
77.
GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70, at 12-14.
78.
Another way of saying this may be seen as less critical of human beings:
the approach considers that human beings are constantly measured in relationship to
an inhuman, unattainable standard of rationality. Recognizing heuristics is simply to
acknowledge the limitations on human rationality that developed in the evolutionary
process, i.e., that, because of their limitations, people needed to develop frugal ways of
thinking. See GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70, at 33-34.
79.
Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis, supra note 73, at 1179-81.
Id.; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1107-13.
80.
See Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis, supra note 73, at 1181-82; Sunstein, A
81.
Progress Report, supra note 73, at 135-36.
82.
Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis, supranote 73, at 1182.
Id. at 1182-84; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1091-95.
83.
84.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1095-1100; Sunstein, A Progress
Report, supra note 73, at 138-39.
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"quasi-rationally," or in a limited, yet adaptively rational manner,
85
instead of acting hyper-rationally or irrationally.
In addition, over the millennia, people have developed ways of
thinking, known as "heuristics,"86 which are used to simplify decisionmaking, but which may not always produce the best outcomes in
certain cases. They have been successful adaptations because they
work well generally. 87 For example, a person may focus on something
that is noticeable to him or her as the issue deserving attention or the
problem needing a solution, such as an airplane accident. 88 The focus
exists even though, according to the probabilistic order of importance,
the event should not receive such extreme focus, which is called the
"availability" heuristic. 89 Related to this way of thinking is the
"anchoring" heuristic where. people make judgments on the basis of
values that are initially given or accepted, even if the values are
arbitrary and not always appropriate for the issue to be decided. 90
Similarly, people often engage in decision-making on the basis of
present cases, examples, or values, from which they then move away
incrementally.9 1 Outside of a crisis, people dislike large, sweeping
92
decisions.
Presentation and social factors enhance these individual
behavioral characteristics. 93 Research indicates that presentation or
"framing" devices trigger biases and emotional effects. 94
For
example, a choice outcome can be helped by framing the desired
choice as the middle one between extremes. 95 Social pressures can
magnify individual cognitive biases.9 6 For instance, in the "cascade"
phenomenon, a few individuals exercising the availability heuristic in
turn influence other people for both 'rational and quasi-rational
reasons. This is the case either because others believe that the first
individuals are privy to special information or that they desire to be
recognized as part of a group that advocates a particular

85.

THALER, supra note 18, at xxi.

86.
See, e.g., Sunstein, A ProgressReport, supra note 73, at 139-42.
87.
See GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70, at 29-31 (for a strong argument
about the adaptive value of heuristics).
88.
See id.
89.
See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1087-88 (observing that, under
the "availability heuristic," people focus on salient events in their decision-making and
ignore their probability, which can lead to error if the events are not truly
representative).
90.
See id. at 1100-02; Sunstein, A ProgressReport, supra note 73, at 141.
91.
See Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis, supra note 73, at 1189-90.
92.
See id. at 1191 (arguing that people are generally averse to "situations of
uncertain probability and try to avoid choices that place them in such situations").
93.
See JANIS, supra note 59, at 175.
94.
See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supranote 69, at 1106.
95.
See id.; Sunstein, A ProgressReport, supra note 73, at 139.
96.
See Timor Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 710-11 (1999).
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perspective. 97 Indeed, groups of people may even create their own
cognitive limitations98 that orient and distort their decision- or policymaking.99
Anglo-American corporate governance advocates have rational
reasons for their corporate finance and governance arguments.' 0 0
The Article suggests that an idealized model of rationality cannot
realistically tell the story about corporate governance advocacy
because of human psychology and limitations on rationality.
Psychological factors will, for example, help reinforce the rationality
of a particular approach and marginalize alternative explanations or
accounts. Psychological pressures may ensure that an adequate
debate about corporate governance does not occur and that the
results achieved are not in fact rational in any idealized sense.
B. The Data and the Study
This Article utilizes French corporate finance and governance
because of my familiarity with the subject, and because of its
timeliness as an arena where methods of finance and governance

97.

See id. at 711. Kuran and Sunstein argue:

The frames through which individuals interpret a situation are generally
formed socially. Their reference points for assessing gains and losses are
generally given by popular conventions and communicated through
conversation, not chosen by individuals autonomously. Anchors, which in
principle can vary enormously across individuals, are in practice the product of
social interactions and widely shared information flows.
Id.
98.
A classic. form is the "groupthink" syndrome, which is the tendency of
individuals to arrive at distorted judgments because of attachment to group norms.
See JANIS, supra note 59, at 174-77.
99.

See also SIGAL G. BASADE, THE RIPPLE EFFECT: EMOTIONAL CONTAGION IN

GROUPS (Yale School of Management, Working Paper Series A, Organizational
Behavior, No. 91, Nov. 1, 2001) (discussing research on group enhancement of
emotions); Sigal G. Barsade & Donald E. Gibson, Group Emotion: A View from Top and
Bottom, in 1 RESEARCH ON MANAGING GROUPS AND TEAMS 81 (1981) (discussing ways
of viewing group emotion as something produced by the group and imposed on
individuals or as a creation of individuals); see generally James P. Walsh, Managerial
and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down Memory Lane, in 6 ORG.
SCIENCE 280-321 (1995) (reviewing and summarizing literature in the managerial and
organizational cognition literature).
100.
Cf. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1073. Korobkin and Ulen argue:
There is no doubt that a single, universally applicable theory of behavior is
convenient and highly desirable. But if universality is inconsistent with
sophistication and realism, legal policymakers are better off foregoing
universality and, instead, creating a , collection of situation-specific mini
theories useful in the analysis of discrete legal problems.
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were being advocated and debated. 10 1 The approach used was first to
identify the public documents, French and non-French, that were the
most influential in French debates that occurred in the last five to ten
years about corporate finance and governance. These major texts are
not difficult to identify for several reasons: because (1) they are, at
least in some cases, official French pronouncements on the subject
and (2) they are included in compilations of corporate governance by
French
most corporate finance and governance authorities. 10 2
documents are either general corporate governance guidelines or
projects for legal reform. 10 3 The non-French texts, while not always
directed at France, were considered important as influential or
reference texts in the general international debates on corporate
of the overall position of corporate
governance, and are representative
10 4
advocates.
governance

101.
There continues to be relatively little work on French corporate governance,
whether inside or outside France, although there are notable exceptions. See PierreHenri Conac, La Dissociation des Fonctions de President du Conseil d'Administration
et de Directeur Gbn6ral des Soci~t~s Anonymes selon la Loi Relative aux Nouvelles
Rbgulations tconomiques (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author),
available at http://www.Droit21.com.
102.
For example, most of the French texts are listed in the Worldbank's library
on corporate governance. See Worldbank, About Corporate Governance, at
http://www.worldbank.orghtml/fpd/privatesector/cg/index.htm.
See ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE DES
103.
These texts are five in number.
ENTREPRISES PRIV9ES, LE CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION DES SOCIETES COT9ES (July
1995), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/country-documents/France/vienotl-fr.pdf
(last visited Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter 1ST VI9NOT REPORT]; PHILIPPE MARINI,
RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOCItT9S (July
13, 1996) [hereinafter MARINI REPORT]; ASSOCIATION FRANQAISE DE LA GESTION
FINANCItRE, RECOMMENDATIONS SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT D'ENTREPRISE (June 23,
AFG RECOMMENDATIONS]; ASSOCIATION FRANQAISE DES
1999) [hereinafter
ENTREPRISES PRIVfs, RAPPORT DU COMITIt SUR LE GOUVERNMENT D'ENTREPRISE
PRI9SIDI9 PAR M. MARC VI9NOT (July 1999), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
country-documents/ France/vienot2_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter 2ND
VIENOT REPORT); ERIC BESSON, RAPPORT FAIT AU NOM DE LA COMMISSION DES
FINANCES, DE L'ECONOMIE GI8NI9RALE ET DU PLAN SUR LE PROJET DE LoI RELATIF AUX
NOUVELLES RItGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES 2327 (Apr. 12, 2000) [hereinafter BESSON
REPORT]. These texts do not show directly Anglo-American corporate governance
advocacy, because they are written by French legislators (or their staff) or business
committees. My contention is that, influenced by this advocacy, they "translate" it for
the French audience. As discussed beloW, they are thus representative of both the
advocacy and the French resistance to it.
104.
They are four. See CALPERS, FRANCE MARKET PRINCIPLES (Mar. 17, 1997),
available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/international/france/page0l.asp
(last visited Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter CALPERS PRINCIPLES]; AD HOC TASK FORCE ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SG/CG(99)5
(Apr. 19, 1999), available at http://www.oecd.org (last visited Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter
OECD PRINCIPLES]; INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, STATEMENT
ON GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES (July 9, 1999), available at
(last visited Sept. 2, 2002)
http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm
[hereinafter ICGN PRINCIPLES]; WORLDBANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION, AN OVERVIEW (September 1999) [hereinafter
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I then reviewed the texts for evidence of the psychological factors
mentioned above and established tables on the presence or absence of
factors in each text. 10 5 The Article initially sidesteps the question to
what extent corporate governance texts reflect the influence of
psychological factors on actual French policy-making by emphasizing
how corporate governance advocates use psychological factors to push
a particular view of corporate finance and governance, as opposed to
how policymakers actually decide issues. The Article assumes and
tries to verify that corporate governance. advocates are attempting to
influence psychologically French policymakers, such as French
business practitioners and legislators. The Article also assumes that
people are not Machiavellian; they try to influence others' decisions
because they have already been persuaded to adopt a particular
perspective. Statements in corporate governance texts are thus
representative of both the advocate's beliefs and attempts to influence
others' beliefs and decisions. 10 6 Yet, admittedly, the Article does
assume that there is a causal link between the advocacy and the
0 7
French corporate governance outcome.'
C. A Brief Overview of French Finance and Governance
Before presenting and discussing the results of the study, it is
useful to give a brief overview of French finance and governance. In
general, French corporate governance is unlike Anglo-American
governance.' 08 However, as will be seen below, Anglo-American
corporate governance advocates have been trying to make the French

WORLDBANK OVERVIEW]. Calpers and the ICGN are clearly representative of AngloAmerican corporate governance advocacy. The OECD and the Worldbank are more
complex cases because they are international organizations or institutions. It is clear,
however, that Anglo-American corporate governance has heavily influenced their
positions on the subject and that, as explained below, they become a significant part of
its advocacy.
105.
I have done this kind of study in a recent work on merger decision-making.
See James A. Fanto, Quasi Rationality in Action: A Study of Merger Decision-Making,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333 (2001). There I looked at psychological factors in joint proxy
statements that reported on the reasons given by boards of directors for their decisions
to enter into mega-mergers.
Admittedly, this approach has an interpretative
orientation because the analyst (i.e., me) decides what in a corporate governance text
indicates that a given psychological factor is present or absent. However, the results of
this kind of analysis are highly suggestive of the presence of psychological factors in
the texts examined, and the data is readily available for any other scholar to examine
and to criticize.
106.
See, e.g., MARINI REPORT, supra note 103.
107.
I offer some evidence on the actual influence of the psychologically-based
Anglo-American advocacy on French corporate governance policy-making. See infra
Part VI.B.
108.
See FANTO, supra note 1 (describing many of the significant legal
differences between U.S. and French corporate governance).
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system similar to that in the United States and the United
Kingdom. 10 9 One may reasonably argue that France is evolving
towards market capitalism." 0 Large French companies are usually
dominated by controlling shareholders,"' and the financial and
managerial relationships between these companies and the French
State remain strong despite significant privatization waves in the
1980s and 1990s.112 For a long time, this meant that the focus of U.S.
corporate governance was of little importance in France. 113 Many of
the legal and nonlegal aspects of Anglo-American corporate
governance were absent or unimportant in France for several
reasons. First, large French companies were primarily financed
through family, state, and bank finance, not by capital market
investors. Second, because their managers generally came from an
elite network of state bureaucrats, these companies were closely
114
monitored by family owners or the state.
French policymakers have been attempting to develop French
market capitalism for a number of understandable reasons: (1)
because of budgetary constraints and European Union regulation, the
French State cannot continue to maintain its large stakes in private
companies; (2) in competing with non-French companies, French
world-class companies need flexible as well as inexpensive sources of
financing; and (3) France wants the benefits that a strong capital
market can give to its securities industry and to its investors. 115
Moreover, with the growth of French capital markets there is
increasing foreign ownership in French companies, particularly by
U.S. institutions. 116 Both U.S. and French institutional investors are
advocating in France a kind of corporate finance and governance that

109.
See sources cited supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110.
See FANTO, supra note 1.
111.
See Patricia Charlety, Activism des Actionnaires: Le Cas Particulier des
Fonds de Pension (Nov. 16, 2000). See also Laurence Bloch & Elizabeth Kremp,
Ownership and Control in France (European Corp. Governance Network, Working
Paper No. D97/97, 1997) (observing that French listed companies still have highlyconcentrated ownership structures, e.g., first investor has about 55%, and owners in
general are not financial firms, but individuals and "holdings"); Isabelle Dherment-

Ferere & Luc Renneboog, Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large
Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies, at 21 (Ctr. For Econ. Research,
Research Paper No. 2000-70, 2000) (presenting data on control of French listed
companies, which shows that the controlling shareholders has generally 50% control
and lists the categories of controlling shareholders, with holding companies, industrial
companies and the government being the most prominent); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P.
Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations,27 J. FIN. ECON.
365, 379 (2002) (noting that, of publicly-traded French firms in data set, approximately
64% are controlled by families).
112.
See FANTO, supra note 1.
113. Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See Bloch & Kremp, supra note 111.
116.
Id.
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is market-based and that resembles Anglo-American corporate
governance. 1 17 There have thus been many French governmental and
business efforts in the 1990s to promote market capitalism. 118 The
most notable efforts were legal changes designed to create a
framework supportive of this capitalism, as well as behavioral
changes that would develop an entrepreneur and investor culture
favoring this kind. of finance and Anglo-American corporate
governance. 119 Several corporate governance texts in the database
120
reflect these efforts.

V. THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY

A. General Results
Table 1 is a compilation of the results from all of the corporate
governance texts. Each text was examined for evidence of a given
psychological factor, and then an admittedly subjective assessment of
its strength was made. A "strong" characterization was given to
repeated and highlighted uses of the factor in a corporate governance
By contrast, a "weak" characterization meant either an
text.
infrequent or unemphasized use of the factor, or the absence of the
factor altogether. No further breakdown of the psychological factors
beyond this strong/weak dichotomy is provided because the Article
discusses the uses of the psychological factors in each text.

Statistics show that French finance is becoming more capital-market
117.
oriented and that there is less bank-based finance, even for smaller enterprises (in
Germany, by contrast, only the largest enterprises are moving away from bank
finance). See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK & BANQUE DE FRANCE, CORPORATE FINANCE IN
GERMANY AND FRANCE 88 (1999) [hereinafter CORPORATE FINANCE]. One of the best

indications of the growth in U.S.-style corporate governance is the activity of the
French equivalent of the U.S. SEC, the Commission des Operations de la Bourse. See,
e.g., COMMISSION DES OP RATIONS DE LA BOURSE, CONSULTATION PUBLIQUE SUR UN
PROJET DE REFORME DE LA PROCftDURE DE CONTROLE DES OPERATIONS FINANCIPRES ET
DE LA DELIVRANCE DU VISA DE LA COB (July 31, 2001) (in requesting comments on a

program regarding public offerings in France, COB promotes a flexible disclosure
system, akin to the U.S. preliminary and final prospectuses, and overall goal of
improving capital raising in France).
118.
See CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 117.
119.
In some respects, France demonstrates Professor Cheffin's thesis that some
European countries may attempt to "jump start" investor capitalism through legal
changes that make it more attractive, even if one understands that law cannot alone
cause investor capitalism. See Cheffins, supra note 66, at 36.
120.
See, e.g., 2ND VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103.
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Table 1 confirms the Author's research and that of others about
and
the pervasive nature of psychological factors in both decision
121
policy-making, and in advocacy aimed at influencing decisions.

This research is growing. As one example of its growth, the Social Science
121.
Research Network consecrates several electronic journals to publishing abstracts of
empirical research with a behavioral and psychological orientation. See, e.g., Social
Science Research Network, Legal Scholarship Network, Experimental and Empirical
Studies, available at http://www.ssrn.com (last visited Sept. 2, 2002).
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TABLE 1
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS FOR GOVERNANCE

DOCUMENTS
Corporate Governance Documents
Origin

French

Non-French

Psychological Factors
Strength

strong.

weak

strong

weak

Besson,
Marini, 18t
Vidnot, 2nd
Vi~not

AFG

ICGN,
Worldbank

Calpers,
OECD

Loss aversion

Besson,
Marini, 1
Vidnot, 2nd
Vidnot

AFG

Calpers,
ICGN,
Worldbank

OECD

Extremeness aversion

AFG, Besson,
Marini, 1mt
Vi~not, 2nd
Vidnot

Calpers,
OECD

ICGN,
Worldbank

Over-optimism

Besson

AFG,
Marini, 11
Vi6not, 2nd
Vi6not

ICGN,
Worldbank

Calpers,
OECD

AFG,
Besson,
t
Marini, 1
Vi6not, 2nd
Vi6not

Worldbank

Calpers,
ICGN,
OECD

Emotion (Impulses)
Myopia

Bias

Hindsight Bias

Heuristic
Availability

Besson,
Marini, 11t
Vidnot, 2nd
Vidnot

AFG

ICGN, OECD,
Worldbank

Calpers

Anchoring

Besson,
Marini, 1-t
Vi~not, 2 nd
Vi~not

AFG

OECD,
Worldbank

Calpers,
ICGN

Case-based decision-making

AFG, Besson,
Marini, 11t
Vidnot, 2nd
Vi6not

Calpers,
OECD

ICGN,
Worldbank

The Table reveals particularly strong use of the psychological
factors of myopia, loss aversion, extremeness aversion, availability,
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anchoring and case-based decision-making. 122 As described in more
detail below, this result is not particularly surprising. Corporate
governance advocates generally presented French corporate
governance as a problem that had to be solved in order to avoid losses
to French firms and investors and they were basing their solution on
Anglo-American governance models. 123 Yet the advocates tried to
present the solution as one that was not "extreme" for the French.
Given these overall goals of the corporate governance advocates, one
would thus expect to see them use each of these factors.
There are noticeable differences between French and non-French
advocates in the use of particular psychological factors. In particular,
all French texts strongly use extremeness aversion and case-based
decision-making. 12 4
This suggests that, in' a politically-charged
environment of longstanding resistance to foreign, and particularly
Anglo-American, solutions, the domestic advocates for corporate
governance change will present their reforms as "middle of the road"
modifications and as being only a few steps away from the existing
situation. This incremental approach would be less necessary for nonFrench advocates who were neither part of the French domestic scene
nor necessarily addressing their documents specifically to the French
context. This is particularly the case with the ICGN and the
Worldbank. 125 The Article illustrates that Calpers is a special nonFrench case because Calpers is the only non-French advocates to
address French corporate governance. 126 ' Hence, Calpers' use of
psychological factors follows more closely the pattern of French
127
advocates.
In contrast, the texts show weak use of several psychological
factors, particularly over-optimism and hindsight bias. 2 8 The lack of
use of optimism is surprising in advocacy texts, as one would expect
that advocates would use this bias to motivate people to change. 129 In
French documents, this absence might be related to the presentation
of suggested corporate governance changes as being incremental and
in the French tradition. There is thus no need for French advocates
to evoke this significant bias and the momentum that it generates to
overcome resistance to change. In contrast, over-optimism does
appear in the most programmatic corporate governance statements
by those groups most aggressive in pushing corporate governance

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See supra TABLE 1.
Id.
See, e.g., 2ND VIENOT REPORT, supra note 103.
See documents cited supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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reform, such as the ICGN and the Worldbank. 130
The lack of hindsight bias, at least by French advocates, is more
understandable. Under the influence of the bias, one blames earlier
decisionmakers or policymakers for errors that are presently
apparent, but were not necessarily apparent in the past. In present
circumstances in France, this would mean that corporate governance
advocates condemn past French policymakers for their corporate
governance policies. But this condemnation contradicts the more
conservative and practical, yet incremental, approach taken by
French corporate governance advocates. Hindsight bias is more likely
to appear in a crisis where condemnation of past policymakers would
be appropriate, which is not yet the case in France. Only the
programmatic Worldbank Overview displays this blame feature of the
131
hindsight bias.
B. Examples of the Use of PsychologicalFactors
The above overview does not adequately convey the different
uses of each psychological factor in corporate governance texts. Thus,
in the following presentation, the Article outlines the various uses.
1. Myopia
This emotion-based motivation suggests that a present or recent
event, or set of circumstances, that generates strong emotions
This
inordinately influences decision or policy-making. 132
psychological factor is often related to the "availability" heuristic,
which causes an individual' to focus on and become attached to an
issue that is present in one's consciousness or memory. 133 Myopia is
clearly and strongly present in corporate governance advocacy texts,
although French and non-French advocates use it differently.
The French documents exhibit strong myopia because their very
existence is justified by reference to the pressure of corporate
governance advocates in France. In the First Vi~not Report, this
strong myopia is exemplified by the Report's self-description as a
response to the "ferment" that corporate governance reports and
discussions, primarily in the Anglo-American world as shown in the
United Kingdom's Cadbury Report, have generated. 134 Formulation

130.

See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104; WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note

104.
131.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supranote 104.
See Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
132.
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 73 (1995).
133.
Id.
134.
See 1ST VItINOT REPORT, supranote 103, at 5, 13.
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and discussions of corporate governance codes of conduct in other
countries put pressure upon French businesses to come up with, their
own corporate governance response. 35 Senator Marini's Report
echoes this approach. He justifies his work by noting the current
corporate governance discussions and activities, and speaks of the
"urgency" of reforming French corporate law in response.' 3 6 Senator
Marini also mentions the pressure from foreign investors in France
who implicitly or explicitly threaten to sell their French investments
13 7
unless changes are made to the French corporate governance rules.
The Second Vi6not Report also shows strong myopia in a way
similar to the First Vi6not Report.13 8 Yet the Second Vi6not Report
justifies itself as a response to the proliferation of international
corporate governance codes, such as the OECD's, similar to the way
that the First Report responded to Cadbury. l3 9 In particular, the
advocacy generating the French myopia comes from international
organizations, not just from Anglo-American investors. By contrast,
while also referring to pressure from foreign investors in France and
international corporate governance reforms, the Besson Report is
motivated more by recent corporate governance related events in the
French capital markets, which sparked domestic debates over the
quality of French corporate governance.' 40 This orientation suggests
that more than general corporate governance debates are necessary
to cause actual changes to French corporate law: there must be
14 1
events in France demonstrating the need for the changes.
The non-French texts split between a strong and weak myopia.
In its Principles, Calpers simply mentions in passing, thus showing a
weak myopia, that France needs foreign investors similar to it
because the French State can no longer capitalize enterprises
itself.142 The OECD Principles refer to the relation between economic
success and corporate governance without dramatizing the
connection. 143 Because it is not focusing on reform in a specific

135.
136.
137.

See id.
See MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 6-7.
See id.

138.

See 2ND VIINOT REPORT, supra note 103.

139.
See id. at 3.
140.
The Besson Report refers to the lengthy takeover battle between Banque
Nationale de Paris, Paribas and Soci~t6 G~n~rale, the problems of funding of, and
abuse of minority shareholders in, Eurotunnel, and the bankruptcy of Cr6dit Lyonnais.
See, e.g., BESSON REPORT, supra note 103, at 14, 28-30.
141.
By contrast, the AFG Recommendations exhibit weak myopia, for this
organization mentions only in passing the corporate governance activity, changes in
French markets, entrance of activist U.S. pension funds as reasons for its proposals.
See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103, at 1.
142.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2.
143.
See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2-3, 13 (referring to increase in
foreign shareholders in capital of firms in many OECD countries).
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country, the OECD weakly uses emotions to motivate change. 144 Yet
the other non-French texts, which come from advocates with powerful
reform programs, strongly evoke a myopic focus on corporate
governance because they are attempting to argue forcefully for a
specific position. 145 The ICGN exhibits strong myopia when it
unequivocally emphasizes the importance of corporate governance for
the economy and for capital market investors. 146 This approach is
typical of the ICGN, which, as an organization of institutional
investors, is a crusader for corporate governance. 147 This same kind
of powerful advocacy typifies the Worldbank because its Overview
emphasizes the importance of corporate governance for the success of
firms and countries, and it states that the speed of adapting to
corporate governance standards is important for a country's economic
success. 148 It may well be that the Worldbank can be particularly
forceful because it dispenses funds and actively tries to change firm
and government behavior, although it does so generally in developing
149
countries.
2. "Status Quo Bias" or "Loss Aversion"
Under this bias, people become overly attached to what they
have-the "endowment effect"-and thus dislike a risk of its loss
more than they like an equal risk of gains-"loss aversion." They do
not like change from their current state of affairs, which the Article
refers to as the "status quo bias." However, people may paradoxically
accept transformation to maintain the "status quo."
The French texts show a strong use of the bias, with some texts
emphasizing loss aversion and others the status quo. 1 50 For example,
the Firs Vi6not Report displays one of the most powerful examples of
status quo bias because it is essentially a reactionary, even a
jingoistic, document. 15 1 Its response to Anglo-American corporate

144.
See id.
145.
See supra TABLE 1.
146.
See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 1-2.
147.
See id.
148.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 2-3.
149.
See id.
150.
See supra TABLE 1.
151.
As an example of its emphasis on French tradition, it would not recommend
change to the French legal focus on the "int~r~t social" in favor of shareholder value.
See 1ST VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 8. It thus reaffirms the "principes
traditionnels du droit et de la pratique" ("traditional principles of law and practice")
that a board represents the corporation, not distinct groups. Id. at 12. It also praises
the French law that gives both the board and its chairman overlapping legal powers,
which in its view allows a French board flexibility to adapt to circumstances. See id. at
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governance reforms, such as the Cadbury, is to observe that little
change is needed to French law to accommodate the demands of
corporate governance advocates. 152 The Report argues that the
status quo is acceptable. 153 In its view, either French law is well
suited to French circumstances and already accommodates most
demands of these advocates, or French companies are making the
necessary governance changes on their own. 154 For instance, it
observes that French law already limits the number of inside
management directors who can sit on a board of directors and it
allows the board to appoint specialized board committees. 15 5 Both
15 6
reforms are high on corporate governance advocates' list.
Moreover, it presents the practices of good corporate governance as
implicit or already used informally in France. 157 Hence, the Report is
simply formalizing what is already present-the status quo. 1 58 When
it does propose reform, the change is characterized as a continuation
of French law and tradition. 159 For example, the Report ties its
recommendation about independent, non-management directors to
French law, which already limits the number of inside, management
160
directors on a firm's board of directors.
The Marini Report also has a strorg status quo bias and offers a
classic statement of it: "Ii s'agit moins d'en changer [la loi] que de la
reformer" ("It is less about changing the law as about reforming
it"). 161 The, Report asserts that it is maintaining "la souplesse
actuelle de la loi frangaise" ("the flexibility of French law") and is
trying to, increase this flexibility "1A off c'est possible, 1A oft c'est
n~cessaire" ("where it is possible or necessary"). 162 Yet the Report
also exhibits a strong loss aversion by its repeated statements about
the need for French law to change in order for France and French
163
firms to maintain a position in international economic competition.
This evocation of potential loss is understandable in a report that

152.
See id.
153.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 7. For example, it is favorable to specialized board committees
154.
(nomination, audit, compensation), and observes that many French companies already
have these committees. Id. at 18.
155.
See id.
156.
See id. at 6. It also observes that French law already provides for the
separation of the CEO and Chairman of the Board (if a firm wants this structure), see
id. at 10, and it declines to mandate the separation, considering that this governance
feature is not significant for the success of the enterprise. See id. at 11 (using status
quo bias as a shield).
157.

See id.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See id. at 23.
See id.
See id. at 13.
MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 7.
See id. at 50.
See id.
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urges actual changes to French law and that is more active in this
advocacy than the First Vi6not Report. 164 In an important passage,
the Report thus observes that "la competition 6conomique met
6galement en concurrence les syst~mes juridiques" ("economic
competition puts into competition legal systems").165
In contrast, the Second Vi~not Report continues the conservative
approach of the First Report with an emphasis on the status quo
rather than loss aversion. 166 The Second Report states that French
companies have continued to evolve in their corporate governance
practices and that the earlier Report worked well in advancing the
French governance situation. 167 For example, the Second Report
praises French law that allows one person to hold both the Chairman
and CEO positions 168 and that does not require disclosure of
individual executive compensation. 1 69 Like the Marini Report, the
Besson Report emphasizes loss aversion by noting that, if changes are
not made to French corporate law, French companies will not be
competitive and international investors will stay away from French
markets. 70 The AFG Recommendations do not use the bias to
advocate change. 171 While the AFG expresses its dissatisfaction with
1 72
it
French legal and business practices, such as cross-shareholdings,
may be that this organization of French institutional shareholders is
reluctant, to appear too aggressive on corporate governance and not
173
adequately supportive of French enterprises.
The emphasis* of the non-French texts is on loss aversion
because, as outsiders to France, they. are not as concerned as the
French advocates in defending the French status quo. Calpers, for
instance, strongly evokes loss aversion by plainly asserting that, if
French companies do not treat their minority shareholders well and
adopt the needed legal reforms, then the funds will go elsewhere with

See id.
164.
165.
See id. at 17 ("[E]conomic competition puts into competition legal
systems.").
166.
See 2ND VI9NOT REPORT, supra note 103.
167.
See id. at 2-3. Indeed, the Report reviews firms' progress on issues raised
in the First Report. See, e.g., id. at 18 (noting increased frequency of meetings of
boards of directors in French firms).
168.
See id. at 6.
169.
See id. at 12,
See, e.g., BESSON REPORT, supra note 103, at 199-200. Again, this emphasis
170.
is not surprising, since the Report reviews proposed legislation dealing with corporate
governance. Also like the Marini Report, the Besson Report points to provisions of
French law that do not need to change to accommodate corporate governance
developments. See id. at 199.
171.
See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103.
172.
Id. at 4, 7.
See id.
173.
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their capital. 174
Calpers states, "If needed capital begins to
disappear, corporate directors may discover their own countrymen
demanding legislative reform. But by then, they may find that
investors are quite happily invested in other markets. Thus, a wise
board would do well to attend to its responsibilities to its minority
shareholders."'175 Similarly, the OECD, as a neutral international
organization, weakly evokes loss aversion when it points out that if
companies are to attract international investors, then their "corporate
governance arrangements must be credible and well understood
1 76
across borders."'
The two organizations with powerful advocacy programs-the
ICGN and the Worldbank-take a strong approach on this bias with
an emphasis on loss aversion. 177 The Preamble to the ICGN
Principles states that corporate governance is necessary to enable
companies to attract scarce capital, and to enhance their performance
and that of their economies. 178 In its Global Voting Principles, the
ICGN warns that an economy risks not receiving capital if (1) it does
not give international shareholders the votes that their capital
deserves, or (2) it makes the voting process too difficult for these
shareholders. 179 The message in the Worldbank Overview is that
countries and companies, particularly companies in developing
nations, will be left behind or fail to prosper if they do not adopt good
governance practices.' 8 0 Indeed, it asserts that the financial stability
18
of these countries is threatened if they do not follow its advice. '
Countries and firms, 'particularly developing countries and their
firms, are warned that they do not have time to wait for structural
reform because they need instant credibility with capital market
18 2
investors.

174.
175.
176.
177.

See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2.

Id.
OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3.
Compare ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, with WORLDBANK OVERVIEW,

supra note 104.

178,

See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2.

179.

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK, GLOBAL SHARE VOTING

at http://www.icgn.org/documents/sharevoting.html
PRINCIPLES
(July 10, 1998),
(representing an additional development of the ICGN's Corporate Governance Principles on
the issue of shareholder voting).
180.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 2 (expressing an urgent
need for reforms to avoid country and company losses).
181.
Id. at 4.
182.
See id. at 17.
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3. Extremeness Aversion
People influenced by this bias do not like extremes and tend to
select the "middle" strategy or outcome when they are presented with
several choices in their decision- or policy-making. In other words, an
advocate can influence decision-making by presenting, in a particular
way, the position he or she wants others to adopt. 183 All the French
documents evoke this bias.' 8 4 The advocate must simply be careful
not to denigrate the status quo of French law or practice, which would
conflict with the status quo bias, in order to push the desired position.
The French texts often harmonize the use of these biases by
some
suggesting that the status quo is dynamic, which justifies
18 5
are."'
they
as
"things
from
away
movement in policy-making
One extreme is the corporate governance that Anglo-American
institutional investors espouse. The other extreme is to maintain
current French finance and governance as they are. This leaves a
middle and psychologically attractive policy position of a new kind of
French corporate governance, which moves people from the French
status quo, but not enough to threaten it seriously. This kind of
advocacy has great psychological power because advocates can argue
that a country is remaining true to its origins on corporate
governance while also urging it gradually towards an Anglo-American
position. Moreover, this approach could be particularly powerful in
the French
France where policymakers desire to be seen as keeping
186
system as an exception to Anglo-American dominance.
This approach characterizes the First Vi6not Report. The Report
highlights that French law and practice on governance are different
from those of the Anglo-Americans. 18 7 In particular, French law
recognizes the firm's overall interest, while Anglo-American law
focuses on the interests of specific groups, primarily the
shareholders. 188 The Report characterizes its reform proposals as
being both within the French "tradition" and small steps away from
the status quo. 189 For example, it rejects the Anglo-American call for
French boards of directors to have a specific number of independent

An advocate can,,for example, present a middle position between two
183.
extremes.
See, e.g., documents cited supra note 103.
184.
See id.
185.
Support of this position is found in MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE
186.
CAPITALISME (1991), in which Albert defends the European systems of capitalism
against those of the United Kingdom and the United States.
187.

See 1ST VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103.

188.
189.

See id. at 8.
See id.
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directors, but recommends that boards consider having at least three
such directors. 190 It further notes that by law one-third of directors of
a French company need to be non-management directors. 191 The
Second Report follows this approach of affirming French "difference"
and proposes small, intermediate steps. 192 For example, the Second
Report observes that French law occupies a middle ground with
respect to the separation of the Chairman and CEO positions, as
compared to the Anglo-American tradition of combination and the
German tradition of separation of the roles. 193 Specifically, French
194 It
law allows a firm to elect either separation or combination.
proposes a small reform to allow separation of the positions in a
unitary
board-where
the
firm
does
not
have
the
management/supervisory board structure-which would give French
19 5
firms the best of all possible worlds.
The Marini Report also strongly uses this bias. 196 In particular,
in discussing the reform of French corporate law, the Marini Report
observes that the law could go in the direction of Anglo-Saxon
contractualization or continued French codification. 197 It then
observes that "[e]n r6alit6, aucune de ces deux approches n'est
r~ellement satisfaisante" ("In reality, neither of these two approaches
is really satisfying"). 198 It proposes a middle ground of reforming
existing law by having it adopt more of an Anglo-American contractbased approach without completely abandoning the French codebased approach. 199 Rather than using the bias to advocate a global
reform strategy, as does the Marini Report, the AFG
Recommendations evoke it to motivate, individual reform

190.
See id. at 12-13 (offering little justification for this suggestion other than to
say that the directors would improve the quality of debates and protect minority
shareholders in a firm with a controlling shareholder).
191.
See id.
192.

See 2ND VI9NOT REPORT, supra note 103.

193.
See id. at 3-4.
194.
See id.
195.
See id. On executive compensation disclosure, the Report juxtaposes the
Anglo-American tradition of full disclosure against 'the Continental one of little
disclosure, and then adopts a middle ground that requires a more detailed disclosure
about executive compensation (e.g., how each company determines executive
compensation) without requiring disclosure of compensation of individual executives.
See id. at 4-5.
196.
See MARINI REPORT, supranote 103.
197.
See id.
198.
Id. at 7 (stating that, "[iln reality, neither of these two approaches is really
satisfying," and observing that wholesale adoption of Anglo-Saxon law and practice
would be too foreign for France as it is based on a different culture and that continued
codification of French law would be too slow to respond to current circumstances).
199.
As another example, the Report observes that, with respect to control of the
firm, French corporate governance is between the shareholder control of the AngloAmerican system and the stakeholder control of the German system. See id. at 88.
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proposals.2 00 For example, they do not advocate eliminating the
"pouvoir en blanc," which is a global proxy that a shareholder gives to
management to vote as the latter sees fit.2 01 Yet, the AFG
Recommendations ask that these proxies be given only for a specific
resolution and request that French law and practice develop other
methods of proxy voting, Such as voting "par correspondence"-by
20 2
mail-or "par procuration"--by way of a stand-in.
Finally, the Besson Report evokes the bias to advocate specific
legal reforms. 20 3 It asserts that its proposed legal changes are not
based on a wholesale adoption of U.S. corporate governance, nor do
they leave that law untouched. 20 4 In discussing a reform of disclosure
of executive compensation that would require disclosure of an
individual executive's compensation, the Besson Report observes that,
while this reform would bring French disclosure in line with U.S. and
U.K. practice, Anglo-American pension funds actually want morenamely, a voice in the determination of the compensation. 20 5 The
proposed legislative solution of disclosing individual executive
compensation thus becomes a middle ground between the current
French practice of disclosure of global executive compensation and
206
the position of the pension funds.
The non-French documents show extremeness aversion in
varying degrees. In an interesting use of the bias, the Calpers
Principles present the proposals of the First Vi~not Report as one
extreme and U.S. corporate governance as the other. 20 7 This leaves
the middle ground of Calpers' proposed reform of French law that
goes beyond those offered in the First Vi6not Report, but not as far as
the position that Calpers would advocate for a U.S. company. 20 8 As a
foreign advocate in France, Capers can thus avoid presenting itself as

200.
See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 103.
201.
See id.
202.
Id. at 4. Similarly, the AFG does not demand disclosure of individual
executive compensation, but only disclosure of global compensation for the main
officers and directors. See id. at 3. It also accepts the French practice of giving double
voting rights to shares held by an individual shareholder for a specified period, but, as
a middle recommendation, suggests that these be eliminated after a firm has been
listed for five years. See id. at 4.
203.

See BESSON REPORT, supra note 103.

204.
See id. at 199.
205.
See id.
206.
See id. at 256-57.
207.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3.
208.
See id. at 6. In keeping with this balanced position, Calpers suggests that
the French stock exchange should have as a listing requirement that a firm disclose its
compliance with the First Vi~not Report. See id. at 3. Yet it does request that any
future French committee looking into French corporate governance reform include a
representative of foreign institutional investors. See id. at 4.
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an extremist Anglo-American fund. 20 9 While, for example, accepting
the First Vi~not Report's suggestion that each board of a French
company have at least two independent directors, it offers two related
proposals: (1) in the medium term, a majority of the non-executive
directors should be independent; and (2) in the long term, a majority
210
of all directors should be independent.
The other non-French texts show this bias in their general
statements about corporate governance, which often reflect a political
compromise that a text is attempting to achieve. For example, in a
strong use of the bias, the OECD Principles take a middle position of
not recommending a specific kind of corporate governance. 211 They
suggest, for example, that independent board members should sit on
key board committees, such as those dealing with audit, nomination
and compensation, without specifying the composition of the
committees. 2 12 For example, should those committees be composed of
majority independent board members? Or perhaps all'independent
board members? They recognize the contribution of stakeholders
other than shareholders to a firm, but offer little in the way of a
definitive course of action regarding these stakeholders. A13
The weakest uses of the extremeness aversion bias are in the
statements most supportive of Anglo-American corporate governance,
such as the ICGN Principles and the Worldbank Overview. This is
because these organizations have no need to take a compromise or
middle position. 2 14 The ICGN Principles offer a weak example of
compromise on stakeholders, which may be explained by the political
2 15
alliance between large institutional investors and labor unions.
They state that a corporation should align stakeholder interests with
those of the corporation and shareholders through stock options,
216
allowing the corporation to remain focused on shareholder value.
Similarly, while the Worldbank Overview states that it is not
advocating a specific kind of corporate governance and points to the
existence of different systems, like those of the United States and

209.
See id.
210.
See id. at 5. As another example, although Calpers wants French law to
eliminate staggered boards and have an annual election of all board members, it offers
as a middle position the elimination of director terms of more than three years. See id.
at 6.
211.
See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3. Again, this is because the
OECD countries themselves have different governance systems.
212.
See id. at 9.
213.
See id. at 18.
214.

See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104.

215.
See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 6 (addressing the role of
stakeholders in corporate governance).
216.
See id. Similarly, it advocates "cooperation" between stakeholders and
companies and firms' "manag[ing] successfully [their] relationship[ ]" with
stakeholders, but offers no further specifics on how to achieve this compromise. See id.
at 5-6.
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Germany, 217 it is plainly supportive of Anglo-American corporate
governance21 8 and offers strong views on the related reforms on a
219
government's competition and trade policies.
4. Over-optimism or Over-confidence
Under this bias, people overestimate their abilities and the likely
success of their decisions. Many advocates of market capitalism and
Anglo-American corporate governance clearly exhibited this bias in
the exuberance of the stock markets of the late 1990s. Yet, as Table 1
indicates, over-optimism is generally weak or absent from both the
French and non-French corporate governance texts alike. 22 0 This is a
surprising result in advocacy texts where one would expect advocates
to use optimism to build support among policymakers for proposed
reforms.
This Article contends that French advocates do not need to use
this psychological factor when they recommend, as do most of the
French advocates, only incremental changes to French corporate
governance and not'a major shift in policy. In other words, if an
advocate were proposing a significant change to the current system,
he or she would need to evoke over-optimism to overcome the status
quo bias. Indeed, the First Vi~not Report speaks optimistically about
existing French corporate governance and the lack of any need for
major reforms, instead of using optimism to push its proposed
reforms. 221 The Marini.Report shows a similarly weak optimism in
its favorable portrayal of existing French law. 222 The Second Vi6not
Report also follows this approach, although its optimism regarding
French corporate governance is more subdued, perhaps because of its
recognition of the increased international pressure for reform of the
French system. 223
Only the Besson Report gives an optimistic
presentation of the need for the legal reform that it presents, which
makes sense because it is the only French document supporting a
proposed change to the law that is the subject of immediate French
2 24
parliamentary action.

217.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 9-10.
218.
See id. at 10 (noting that, as a result of globalization, there is increasing
harmonization of governance practices).
219.
See id. at 7-8.
220.
See supraTABLE 1.
See, e.g., 1ST VIANOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 5, 10, 12.
221.
See MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 18.
222.
223.
See 2ND VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 3-4 (discussing proposed reform
of French board structure that would allow the chairperson of the board to be someone
other than the chief executive officer of the company). The AFG Recommendations do
not display this psychological feature. See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 103.
224.
See, e.g., BESSON REPORT, supranote 103, at 14.
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As Table 1 indicates, the non-French texts show more optimism
than do the French texts.
This is because of their generally
programmatic nature, which suggests that, if the proposed corporate
governance guidelines are followed, then economic success for firms
and countries will ensue. 225 The Calpers Principles, which is the
least programmatic of the group, display only weak optimism in this
regard.2 26 The OECD Principles exhibit a similarly weak optimism
based on their assertion that, if its principles were followed, then an
economy would do better as would companies and all stakeholders
involved therein. 227 In contrast, the ICGN Principles provide strong
over-optimism in their confident presentation of their approach to
corporate governance. 228
Finally, as one might predict, the
Worldbank Overview exhibits the same strong optimism.2 29 More
than any other organization, the Worldbank has an ambitious reform
program, and therefore needs to generate optimism to motivate its
addressees.
5. Hindsight Bias
This bias involves judging past decision- or policy-making from
the perspective of the present and thus thinking that the result of the
decision or policy was more predictable than it in fact was.230 The
bias is usually employed to fix blame for a present state of affairs or
outcome on the decisionmaker or policymaker. 23 1 A hypothetical
example of the bias would be if a corporate governance advocate were
to say that, during the post-war years when they disregard French
corporate law and governance, French policymakers made erroneous
policies favoring state and family control of enterprises over the
development of market capitalism. That is, if they had favored

225.
See documents cited supra note 104.
226.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 6 (discussing the advantages of
eliminating the French practice of having companies hold shares of other companies,
which in turn hold shares in the former (cross-holdings)).
227.
See, e.g., OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3 (discussing the
advantages of good corporate governance).
228.
See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2 ("The ICGN contends that if
investors and managers succeed in establishing productive communication on issues,
they will have enhanced prospects for economic prosperity, fuller employment, better
wages, and greater shareholder wealth.").
229.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 2 ("Countries realize that
just as overall governance is important in the public sector, so corporate governance is
important in the private sector. They also realize that good governance of corporations
is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and social progress."), at
12 ("The evidence increasingly suggests that such behavior [following voluntary codes
of corporate governance] enhances the reputation and value of companies.").
230.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69, at 1095-96; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 1182-84.
231.

BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 1182-84.
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market capitalism, as opposed to state and family capitalism, their
firms and investors would probably be in a better position in the
current investment and business world.
* This example, with its emphasis on blame, underscores why the
bias is relatively absent from the governance texts. That the bias is
generally weak or non-existent in the French texts is not surprising
given that the texts emphasize how French corporate governance,
suited to French circumstances, is being changed by outside events
and investors. 23 2 With one exception, the French texts do not imply
that earlier French policymakers went down the wrong path in their
corporate governance policies. 23 3 One may expect that only a major
crisis, when people are looking to blame others for past policies and
decisions, would result in texts exhibiting the hindsight bias. That
kind of a crisis has not happened yet in French corporate
governance.2 34 Moreover, the. incremental approach to corporate
governance change that is characteristic of French texts is
incompatible with the hindsight bias in any strong form.23 5 This is
because the approach assumes that the existing state of affairs is
236
generally acceptable and in need of only minor modifications.
The only real suggestion of the bias is in the Marini Report,
which argues that French policymakers made a mistake in 1966 by
excessively codifying corporate law and by embracing the "social
interest" principle to orient this law.23 7 Marini contends that this
approach resulted in an inflexible law that neglected the contractual
nature of the firm, and that is thus not suitable to the kind of market
2 38
capitalism that policymakers had all along wanted to develop.
In the non-French texts, the bias is similarly absent or weak,
except when advocates point out that certain countries have taken
the wrong approach to corporate governance. 239
The Calpers
Principles exhibit a weak form of the bias by suggesting that French
law and practice have improperly ignored shareholder interests to
accommodate those of the French State. 240 As befits its aggressive
message on corporate governance, the Worldbank exhibits a strong
form of this bias: it blames countries, particularly developing

232.
See documents cited supra note 103.
233.
See MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 7-8
policymakers excessively codified corporate law in 1966).
234.
See documents cited supra note 103.
235.
See id.
236.
See id.
237.
See, e.g., MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 7-8.
238.

Id.

239.
240.

See documents cited supra note 104.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2.

(implying that French
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countries, for lacking good corporate governance laws24 1and for
erroneous decisions on corporate governance-related issues.
6. Availability Heuristic
A heuristic is a short-cut way of thinking. . Under the
"availability" heuristic, people believe that something is an issue or a
problem if they find it available, which means that they can call it
readily to mind, like a recent disaster. 242 The heuristic can produce
availability "cascades," which are social phenomena where people are
motivated by one another's focus on a recent event or problem. The
focus caused by the heuristic may well contradict the statistical
importance of the event or problem. 243 The results on availability
will likely mirror those for myopia because, under each psychological
present
attention
to
pay
inappropriate
factor,
people
circumstances .244
In France, observers would expect to see evidence of the
availability heuristic, and even an availability cascade, with the
attention there to Anglo-American corporate governance. The quasirational aspect of this example of availability arises from the fact that
it has not yet been convincingly established that a particular form of
corporate governance has a determining effect on a firm's
Firms with very
productivity or success in the marketplace. 245
different governance systems are successful in the world's
economy. 246 In other words, the French focus on Anglo-American
corporate governance, and even on corporate governance itself, may
not be rational, because it owes much to the publicity on the subject
generated by corporate governance advocates.
Unsurprisingly, the French documents strongly present the
heuristic; Anglo-American corporate governance and debate over
French corporate governance are the issues in them and are, in fact,
the reason for the documents' existence and reform proposals.2 47 The

241.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 18 ("With such opposition, it
is not surprising that corporate governance reforms (in developed countries as well as
developing and transition economies) have often been driven by major economic crisis
or serious corporate failure.").
242.
See generally GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 69 (explaining and giving examples of heuristics).
243.
See generally GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, supra note 69 (explaining and giving examples of heuristics).
244.

See generally GIGERENZER ET AL., supra note 70; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND

ECONOMICS, supra note 69 (explaining and giving examples of heuristics).
See, e.g., Black, supra note 17, at 2133-34.
245.
246.
See id. (referring to the debate, and data, over the importance of corporate
governance for economic performance of a firm).
247.
See, e.g., 1ST VIENOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 5; 2ND VItNOT REPORT,
supra note 103 (stating that special committees were formed to study corporate
governance).
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results here mirror those for myopia. 248 The subject of corporate
governance, as described in the First Vi~not Report, came from its
availability because of the activity of Anglo-American corporate
governance advocates, such as Sir Adrian Cadbury. 249 The Marini
Report 25 0 and the Second Vi6not Report 25 1 exhibit the same strong
presentation based upon their accepting the importance of, and the
In the Besson
international focus on, corporate governance. 2 52
Report, the strong characterization arises from its straightforward
recognition of standard corporate governance issues that it uses to
In contrast, the AFG
justify the legal reform proposals. 253
Recommendations offer a weak use of availability, primarily because
they assume, without explaining why, corporate governance matters
for a firm's success. 25 4
From another perspective, this tacit
assumption may in fact reveal a strong form of the heuristic because
the AFG accepts-without any need for justification-the importance
255
of the subject and the Anglo-American approach.
Not surprisingly, the non-French documents again show a strong
use of availability because they assume or state that corporate
governance issues are matters of importance and must be addressed
by France and all other countries. 25 6 The OECD Principles strongly
exhibit this heuristic if only because they are part of a report on
corporate governance.2 57 The ICGN Principles strongly exhibit the
heuristic by providing a commentary on the OECD Principles. 258 The
ICGN Principles contain additional assertions about the importance

248.
See supraTABLE 1.
249.
See 1ST VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 12 (discussing the need for
independent directors on a company's board).
250.
See MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 96-97 (discussing the ability for
investors to bring a class action in France).
251.
See 2ND VItNOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 6 (discussing separation of
CEO and Chairman in a board of directors, a major issue for Anglo-American corporate
governance).
252.
See supra notes 250-51.
253.
See BESSON REPORT, supra note 103, at 236 (discussing disclosure
concerning conflicts of interest).
254.
See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103, at 1.
255.
Id.
256.
See, e.g., ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 1-2 (stating that the OECD
principles show government recognition that corporate governance is an important
pillar in the twenty-first century global economy).
257.
See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2 ("One key element in
improving economic efficiency is corporate governance, which involves a set of
relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders."), at 3 ("At the same time, work carried out in Member countries and
within the OECD has identified some common elements that underlie good corporate
governance. The Principles build on these common elements and are formulated to
embrace the different models that exist.").
258.
See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 1-2.
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of corporate governance. 259 The Worldbank Overview provides the
The opening page of the
strongest example of the heuristic.
Worldbank Overview is entitled, "Why corporate governance
matters-now more than ever." 260 Similarly, the Worldbank Overview
states that, "[C]ountries realize that just as overall governance is
important in the public sector, so corporate governance is important
261
in the private sector."
The Calpers Principles present an interesting, yet weak, example
262
of the heuristic. Calpers is a major U.S. institutional investor.
However, its discussion about France is based on the First Vi6not
Report, which itself was a reaction to the corporate governance
advocacy by institutional investors like Calpers that made corporate
governance "available" in France in the first place. 263 The Principles
thus begin with proposals for reform without providing the necessary
importance;
the
justification
about corporate
governance's
264
assumption is that corporate governance simply matters.
7. Anchoring Heuristic
Under this heuristic, people make decisions or policies, or at
least orient their decision- or policy-making, on the basis of a value or
'anchor" that may be arbitrarily chosen and to which people hold fast,
despite the rationality of other values. 265 In this case, the anchor is
Anglo-American corporate governance. This heuristic is related to
availability and myopia: people "anchor" to Anglo-American corporate
governance because, in contemporary debates about corporate
governance, it is simply available. One would expect the heuristic to
be strongly present in the texts because the entire corporate
governance discussion, is based on Anglo-American corporate
governance. 266 The quasi-rationality of this anchor, however, arises
because financial economists have shown that Anglo-American
corporate governance is the minority form of corporate governance
around the world and is by no means correlated with strong company

See id. ("The ICGN affirms-with the OECD Principles-that along with
259.
traditional financial criteria, the governance profile of a corporation is now an essential
factor that investors take into consideration when deciding how to allocate their
investment capital. The Principles highlight elements that ICGN investing members
already take into account when making asset allocation and investment decisions.").
260.
WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 1.
261.
Id. at 2.
262.
See documents cited supra note 104.
263.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104; IST VItNOT REPORT, supra note
103.
264.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2. Again, as in the case of the
AFG Recommendations, this perspective could be viewed as a "strong" case of
availability because it takes the importance of corporate governance for granted.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 69.
265.
266.
See, e.g., 2ND VILINOT REPORT, supra note 103.
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267
or country economic performance.
The French documents confirm this prediction. Even if AngloAmerican corporate governance practices and values are not entirely
accepted, and are even contested by the French, they are clearly the
bases or anchors against which French law and practice are
measured and judged. 26 8 Although the First Vi6not Report asserts its
fidelity to French legal and governance values, it centers its entire
discussion on positions and reforms pushed by Anglo-American
corporate governance advocates. 269 Anglo-American capitalism and
governance are taken as a base, which is particularly seen in the
First Report's comments on firms' cross-shareholdings and reciprocal
directors. 270 The Marini Report also strongly anchors to AngloAmerican corporate governance values, despite its assertion that it
remains close to French legal tradition.2 7 1 As in the First Report, the
Second Vi6not Report takes the Anglo-American values as given, even
if the Report disagrees with some of them.27 2 A notable example is
the Second Report's comments on the disclosure of executive
compensation, an issue that is at the heart of Anglo-American
In discussing legislative changes, the
corporate governance. 273
Besson Report constantly refers to Anglo-American laws and
practices as establishing the standards against which the reforms
should be measured. 274 For example, Besson looks at how U.K. and
U.S. firms separate the powers between the Chairperson and CEO. 275

267.
See La Porta et al., Corporate OwnershipAround the World, supra note 31,
at 492-98.
268.
See, e.g., 2ND VI9NOT REPORT, supra note 103 (using Anglo-American
corporate ideals as the measure of effectiveness for French corporate law).
269.
1ST VIENOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 15.
270.
Id. (describing French capitalism as being "weak" because there are no
pension funds and other kinds of institutional investors, which necessitates the crossshareholdings with other companies). Similarly, the Report's discussion of director
duties is based upon Anglo-American models of board member behavior. See id. at 21
(describing such duties as requiring board members to gather information and avoid
conflicts of interest).
271.
See MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 8 (observing that the law, in
focusing on "int6r~t social," has neglected that "la premiere raison d'6tre de toute
soci~t6 est 'enrichissement de ses actionnaires" ("the first reason for existence of every
company is the enriching of its shareholders")-the shareholder value standard pushed
by Anglo-American corporate governance advocates).
272.
2ND VIgNOT REPORT, supranote 103, at 11.
Id. (disagreeing with the position of disclosure of an individual executive's
273.
compensation in favor of retaining disclosure of global executive compensation but
adding further information on the method of determining this compensation).
BESSON REPORT, supra note 103, at 207.
274.
Id. Similarly, with respect to disclosing contracts involving conflicts of
275.
interest between a director and his or her firm, Besson notes that this disclosure occurs
in the United Kingdom and the United States. See id. at 236. Besson also notes, in
discussing the disclosure of individual compensation of board members and directors,
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The non-French texts generally anchor to Anglo-American
corporate governance values because the texts can be seen 2as
76
programs for the development of this kind of corporate governance.
This is particularly true of the Worldbank Overview. 277 The Calpers
Recommendations exhibit weak anchoring, if only because their
2 78
dependence on the values is implicit and understood by all.
Obviously, this institutional shareholder is promoting these values,
but it is not discussing the values at length or even putting them into
the foreground; Calpers assumes the values' validity. The ICGN
Principles, like Calpers, exhibit weak anchoring. Although the OECD
Principles disavow advocacy of one system of corporate governance
over another, they refer favorably to practices in member countries,
particularly to Anglo-American practices. 279 In discussing equitable
treatment of shareholders, the OECD Principles point out that
shareholders need some form of redress for abuses, and companies
need to be protected from excess litigation. 28 0 Both goals may be
achieved by rules like the "business judgment rule" in U.S. corporate
law.281 Even more strongly than the OECD, the Worldbank Overview
anchors to Anglo-American governance practices by telling developing
countries that they must look to the standards of developed countries
and those of the global investment community for their corporate
282
governance models.

that this disclosure is one of the bases of the Anglo-Americans corporate governance
and specifically refers to SEC disclosure and U.K. practices. See id. at 256.
Once again, the weakest example comes from the AFG Recommendations, which
sporadically and implicitly refer to Anglo-American corporate governance values. For
instance, they argue that the French practice of blocking shares to identify
shareholders eligible to vote in shareholders' meetings should be abolished in favor of
one modeled upon the U.S. "record date." See AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
103, at 5. Again, this implicit acceptance of Anglo-American corporate governance
values might equally be considered to be "strong" anchoring.
276.
See ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104 (stating that ICGN principles are
minimum acceptable standards for companies and investors around the world).
277.
278.

WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104.
CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104.

279.
OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 16 (showing a trend in OECD
member countries regarding custodian institution voting rules).
Id. at 15-17.
280.
281.
See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 15. The Principles also advocate
disclosure practices, mentioning the experience of such practices in countries with
large capital markets. See id.at 19-22. They also appear to "anchor" to board practices
associated with Anglo-American countries, particularly the independent director and
the use of different board committees on which independent directors should sit. See
id. at 23-24.
282.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 17. The anchor is styled as
the "culture of compliance and enforcement," as opposed to crony behavior and state
control. See id. at 19. It observes that firms and countries must adhere to the "best
practices and rules set by global markets." See id.
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8. Case-based Decision-making
Here, parties prefer to make incremental decisions or policies
when faced with specific problems rather than make major changes.
Because this heuristic i related to the people's innate conservatism,
the results approximate those for the status quo bias and, to a lesser
extent, extremeness aversion. 283 Since the French texts support the
status quo and avoid extremes, they uniformly propose incremental
governance changes or portray their reforms as small and based upon
earlier ones. 28 4 In its strong use of this heuristic, for example, the
First Vi6not Report proposes small adaptations to French law to
accommodate foreign investors, rejecting any major reform as
unnecessary. 28 5 The Marini Report, as might be expected from the
above, also exhibits a strong use of the heuristic even if some of its
proposals are in fact major. 28 6 The AFG Recommendations are
similarly incremental in nature, despite the AFG's stated disapproval
of some French governance practices. For example, it recommends
the gradual elimination of allotting shares double voting rights 28 7 and
a minor adjustment to the age of so-called "elderly" directorsnamely, dropping the mandatory retirement age limit from seventy to
sixty-five.2 88 The Second Vi6not Report makes numerous incremental
28 9
as does the Besson Report. 290
proposed changes to French practice,
For example, the Besson Report observes that allowing "virtual"
presence of directors at board meetings is a small step following
previous legal reforms that permit a board more flexibility in
291
scheduling its meetings.
The non-French texts are mixed on their use of this heuristic.
One would expect to see little of the heuristic in any programmatic
text, which is the case for the ICGN Principles and the Worldbank

283.
See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 69.
284.
See 1ST VINOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 5 (advocating small changes in
French corporate law).
285.
Id.
286.
MARINI REPORT, supra note 103, at 44-45. There are too many examples to
cite in this program for reform of changes to French law. For example, it makes a
minor reform suggestion regarding the number of directorships that a person could
have (i.e., include within the eight allowed by French law at that time those otherwise
excluded in the calculation-directorships in subsidiaries of the company). Id.
AFG RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 103, at 4.
287.
288.
Id. at 9.
289.
See, e.g., 2ND VIIkNOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 6-10 (proposing
modification to French law to allow chairperson to be other than the chief executive
officer).
290.
BESSON REPORT, supra note 103.
291.
Id. at 222-24.
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Overview.2 9 2 For example, the Worldbank Overview admits that
reforms must be made on a country-by-country basis, 293 but it makes
broad assertions regarding the necessary reforms, with the
suggestion that there is likely to be only one approach that may well
sweep away a country's existing practices.2 94 There is, however, a
kind of incrementalism in the Calpers Principles and the OECD
Principles. The Calpers Principles show a strong use of the heuristic
2 95
in their strategy of pushing for small changes to French practice.
Surprisingly, the OECD Principles have a strong use of the heuristic
if only because they do not specify many corporate governance
reforms and make vague, general statements without forcefully
2 96
pushing for major changes in countries.

VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

A. General Implications
What are the implications of identifying quasi-rationality in the
key texts showing the efforts of Anglo-American corporate governance
advocates in France?297 The study offers an interesting perspective
on the corporate governance debates. It is clear that corporate
governance advocates-consciously or not-used psychological factors
to manipulate or persuade policymakers, such as French legislators
and regulators, members of the investment community, and CEOs, to

ICGN PRINCIPLES, supra note 104; WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104.
293.
See WORLDBANK OVERVIEW, supra note 104, at 10 ("The systems may vary
by country and sector and even for the same corporation over time.").
294.
See id. ("These global market pressures are providing the impetus for
private investors to harmonize corporate governance practice-to reduce risk to
investors and hold down the cost of capital to corporations.").
295.
See, e.g., CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 2 (discussing the
importance of French law and practice to focus on minority shareholders). The changes
are not in all cases as insignificant as the Report suggests.
296.
See OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3. The Principles state:
292.

There is no single model of good corporate governance. At the same time, work
carried out in Member countries and within the OECD has identified some
common elements that underlie good corporate governance. The Principles
build on these common elements and are formulated to embrace the different
models that exist. For example, they do not advocate any particular board
structure and the term "board" as used in this document is meant to embrace
the different national models of board structures found in OECD countries.
Id.
297.
As a general matter, it should be no surprise that quasi-rationality exists in
these circumstances, given the prevalence of psychological factors in human behavior.
The study confirms the presence of the psychological factors in yet another human
activity.

2002]

PERSUASION AND RESISTANCE

1087

support a particular form of corporate finance and governance. 298 In
other words, advocates used "framing effects" or devices to trigger
the psychological emotions, biases, and heuristics in French legal and
299
business policymakers.
This perspective also implies that the psychologically powerful
advocacy altered the French corporate governance debate by pushing
30 0
Anglofinance and governance alternatives into the background.
American corporate governance clearly oriented the debate, which is
demonstrated by the study's results on myopia, availability, and
anchoring. 30 1 In using the psychological factors, it is true that some
advocates, particularly the French, did not argue for the AngloAmerican solution in a one-sided way. 30 2 As the study demonstrates,
French advocates, who were themselves coming to terms with the
Anglo-American position, often extolled the strengths of the French
system. 30 3 Several of the non-French advocates, particularly the
OECD, took a balanced position on the merits of different kinds of
corporate governance. 30 4 As international organizations, such as the
Worldbank, increasingly favored the Anglo-American model, and as
Anglo-American institutional investors became more vocal in France,
even French organizations became more accepting of this model. The
French became less willing to defend their own.
Concluding that psychological manipulation that placed
governance alternatives in an unfavorable light existed in the French
corporate governance debates leads to a more serious and troubling
consequence: that corporate governance advocates did not necessarily
promote a corporate finance and governance solution most suitable
for France. Admittedly, this is a difficult argument to advance
because it presupposes that one can state with confidence what is
now the best governance outcome for France, and even for other
developed countries. Identifying this solution or outcome has been a
subject of considerable debate in finance and financial law since
30 5
corporate governance has become an area of sustained scholarship.

298.
See documents cited supra notes 103, 104.
299.
See documents cited supra notes 103, 104.
300.
See documents cited supra notes 103, 104.
301.
See supraTABLE 1.
302.
See documents cited supra note 103.
303.
Id.
304.
See, e.g., OECD PRINCIPLES, supra note 104, at 3 ("There is no single model
of good corporate governance. At the same time, work carried out in Member countries
and within the OECD has identified some common elements that underlie good
corporate governance. The Principles build on these common elements and are
formulated to embrace the different models that exist.").
305.
See, e.g., La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,
supra note 31, at 6-13 (referring to 'the debates on this point within law and finance).
Again, a Nobel economist like Merton Miller would likely have confidence regarding
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Even if one cannot identify the best corporate governance
solution, whether in France or elsewhere, one can at least argue that
it makes little sense to promote, without qualification, AngloAmerican corporate governance in France for several reasons. First,
even if Anglo-American corporate finance and governance were a
superior system in current economic conditions, it might not be best
to advocate them in an unqualified way in France because, as
Professor Mark Roe has contended, the promotion might lead to too
much short-term political resistance.3 0 6 Because many features of
this form of governance-namely, shareholder primacy and exclusion
of employees from a major role in the corporate governance
framework-are not immediately acceptable in, and indeed conflict
with aspects of, the French system, its unbridled promotion, to say
nothing of its adoption, might produce a political and legal backlash
30 7
that could lead to worse results than the current situation.
Although France has a sophisticated economy and successful, worldclass companies, market capitalism has not taken complete hold even
among its affluent population. 30 s Market capitalization may well need
to be developed in a particular way if it is to be successfully
implemented so that it does not provoke too much resistance from
those who are threatened by it.30 9 The bald advocacy of Anglo-

the best system. See Stulz, supra note 27, at 20. See also Michael C. Jensen, Value
Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2001) (arguing that "200 years' worth of work in economics
and finance indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy
attempt to maximize their own total firm value").
See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1998)
306.
(describing the potential for political backlash to corporate governance advocacy or to
any legal changes motivated by pure efficiency concerns).
307.
See id. at 234. See also Rajan & Zingales, supra note 16, at 5. Rajan and
Zingales argue:
[T]he competitive forces unleashed by open markets have a downside in that
they can destroy some forms of relationships and the associated insurance
These forces also
provided by domestic social and economic institutions ....
reduced the ability of the political authorities in each country to intervene to
provide the insurance. The consequences were not particularly troubling when
economies were doing well. But as the world slid into depression towards the
end of the 1920s, the public felt the loss of insurance when faced with severe
and widespread shocks. These enabled the public to overcome collective action
problems. The popular clamor from the masses for political action to reverse
the effects of the market strengthened. Incumbents rode on the coattails of the
popular demand for insurance to overcome any political strength accumulated
by advocates of financial development during the period of openness. (citations
omitted).
Id.
See documents cited supra notes 103, 104.
308.
309.
For example, in a survey of European attitudes towards the welfare state,
researchers Tito Boeri, Axel Borsch-Supan and Guido Tabbellini found that the largest
group of the French respondents wanted to maintain the welfare state as is (with a
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American corporate governance might thus make no sense in a
particular culture, like France, unless it is adjusted to the culture's
310
circumstances.
Second, and related to the previous point, is the problem of
advocating changes in France that may not be effective, even if
creating an Anglo-American capitalism were an agreed-upon goal.
Much of the program for Anglo-American corporate governance
advocates involves France's adopting laws similar to those found in
market capital systems. Behind this advocacy lies the belief that, if a
country adopts laws used in market capitalist economies, market
capitalism will follow. This position has considerable support; from
the financial economists who have established correlations between
legal systems and forms of capitalism and who are influential in
This cause-and-effect
organizations like the Worldbank. 3 11
relationship between legal rules and forms of capitalism is too

clear majority electing either to maintain or increase it). See Tito Boeri, Would You
Like to Shrink the Welfare State? A Survey of European Citizens, 16 ECON. POL'Y 32, 33
(2001).
Clearly, Senator Marini was aware of this argument. See MARINI REPORT,
310.
supra note 103, at 7 ("D'une part, parce que les modbles anglo-saxons s'inscrivent dans
un environnement sociologique et juridique diffbrent, leur simple transposition n'est ni
possible, ni souhaitable." In English: "On the one hand, because Anglo-Saxon models
are immersed in a different sociological and legal environment, their simple adoption is
neither possible nor desirable."). See also Licht et al., supra note 42, at 152-59 (noting
that governance positions must be adjusted for a country's culture if they are to
succeed). Even financial economists realize that reforms in a given context must be
suitable for it. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Investor Protectionand Corporate Governance,
supra note 31, at 22 ("The strategy for reform is not to create an ideal set of rules and
then see how well they can be enforced, but rather to enact the rules that can be
enforced within the existing structure.").
See documents cited supra note 31. The influence of these economists
311.
among policymakers was clear from their involvement in reform efforts in the 1990s
involving the promotion of markets in Russia and other former Socialist countries. In
their current work these economists are beginning to realize that laws may grow out of
culture and that, therefore, they cannot be easily engrafted onto other situations with
the same effect. See EDWARD L. GLAESER & ANDREI SHLEIFER, LEGAL ORIGINS (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8272, 2001), available at
http://papers.nber.orgpapers/08272.pdf (describing the historical origins of the civil and
common law systems that may have resulted in their being less and more promotive of
market capitalism). See also EDWARD L. GLAESER & ANDREI SHLEIFER, THE RISE OF THE
REGULATORY STATE (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 1934,
2001), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2001papersHIER1934.pdf
("The goal of economic institutions is the same across times and places, namely to
secure property and to make perpetrators of harmful acts accountable. But even though
the goals are constant, which institutions are appropriate for achieving them varies.") On
the new interest in the importance of the creator and enforcer of laws, rather than laws
themselves, see Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law-A Conceptual and
Analytical Framework, and its Application to the Evolution of Financial Market
Regulation (Jan. 2002) (on file with the author) (discussing the importance of market
regulator in financial law).
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simplistic, however, at least in developed countries. 312 Putting so
much psychological pressure behind particular legal changes313may be
completely misguided and not achieve what advocates hoped.
Third, from a normative perspective, if Anglo-American
corporate governance is transplanted to France "as-is," then it may
not address governance problems and related social issues peculiar to
France. It is well known that France is a highly elitist culture, a
characteristic partly based upon the state's cultivation of a governing
elite through a system of ostensibly meritocractic recruitment, at
least since the time of Napoleon. 3 14 A major problem for the last

See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Law Consequences, 53
312.
STAN. L. REV. 1463, 1480-82 (2001); MARK ROE, THE QUALITY OF CQRPORATE LAW
ARGUMENT AND ITS LIMITS 5 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies,
Working Paper No. 186, 2001), available at http://www.law.columbia.edulaweconomicsstudies/papers/wp186.pdf. Professor Roe argues,
Moreover, by focusing so strongly on developing good corporate law institutions
first, policy-makers could be using the wrong strategy: It did not happen that
way before, and a better strategy (if not foreclosed by other impediments) may
have been first to develop private enterprise (probably in closely held form) and
then, when entrepreneurs sought to raise new capital, to merge, or to sell, later
seek to build corporate and securities law institutions. Policymakers are trying
to use corporate law to bring about, or to make up for the lack of, fundamental
change elsewhere in those societies, seeking to remedy their lack of regularity,
their weak private institutions generally, and their worthless reputational and
social capital. This effort to so use corporate law is laudable, perhaps even
necessary as the only, or as the best, available tool, but we shou ld appreciate
that such efforts would not replicate what worked before, and would have
corporate law do something new and much more ambitious.
Id.
Admittedly, in attacking the law-centered explanation of corporate governance,
Professor Roe is defending a position that made his reputation-that politics is just as
important a determinant of corporate governance outcomes as is the law. See id.
313.
This is not to suggest that corporate and securities law reform is trivial, or
that it cannot have an impact in a governance situation. However, a truly effective
reform program cannot rely exclusively on the law. I thus disagree with Professor Roe,
who tends to relegate legal reforms to the technical and unimportant category. See
ROE, QUALITY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 312, at 36-37. Professor Coffee takes a
position similar to Roe's when he argues that corporate governance changes comes
primarily from transformations in behavior by market participants, and only
secondarily from legal reform. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 91 ("By no means does this
imply that stronger legislation protecting minority rights is not desirable, but
historically this step has followed and not preceded the initial growth of the equity
market.").
314.
Cf. GERALDINE CARMINATT'I.MARCHAND & MATHIEU PAQUEROT, THE ELITE
AND THEIR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS (2001) (arguing that French company boards and
management are "colonized" and operated for the benefit of elite networks from elite
schools, such as ENA and Polytechnique; U.S. corporate governance reforms hardly
address this kind of domination, unless the elite can embrace the reforms). I say
"ostensibly" because French sociologists have found that elites generally come from
well-off families and thus that the elites perpetuate themselves, although through a
seemingly neutral recruitment process. See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA NOBLESSE
D'ETAT: GRANDES ECOLES ET ESPRIT DE CORPS (1989).
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decade in France has been to curb the abuses of the elite in
government and industry, regardless of the political party in
power.3 15 It is not at all clear that the extension of Anglo-American
corporate governance will necessarily reduce the power of the elite.
The elite may simply use corporate governance reforms for their own
benefit, or a particular group of the elite may promote the reforms to
increase its power at the expense of other groups. Admittedly, this
form of governance may have the potential for transforming French
society if it erodes the power bases of the traditional elite-namely, in
state and family ownership of companies-and if it gives economic
power to other groups in French society. Indeed, that certain French
parties are behind the reforms may suggest that these groups have
gained enough strength to upset the power relations typical of former
state/family French capitalism. Nevertheless, any French governance
reform will have to address, with sensitivity and thoughtfulness, the
elite issue if it were to have an enduring, transforming effect in
France and not simply to become another tool of the elite. 316 AngloAmerican corporate governance advocacy is completely silent on this
issue.
Fourth, and finally, one may argue that France's adopting of
Anglo-American corporate governance may not be the best outcome
for ordinary people in all circumstances because it introduces much
more risk in their lives than does state and family-based
capitalism.3 17 The nature of risk-as seen in recent circumstances in
the United States-is that there is considerable volatility about
3 18
investment return, which may be both negative and positive.
Policymakers might well question whether they want individuals to
bear this risk because a negative outcome is difficult to support
politically as it may produce even worse economic and political
outcomes. That is, Do policymakers really want ordinary people to
hold riskier, market-based assets so that if there is a significant
market decline, they may make even more demands upon the
government for help? Through financial intermediaries or state

See, e.g., The Bitterness of a Judge, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 43 ("In
315.
Mr. Halphen's view, 'justice works at two speeds' in France: the ordinary criminal gets
hammered while the politically powerful get off scot-free.").
Indeed, recent finance literature studies the role of elites in promoting, or
316.
restraining, financial development. See generally Beck et al., supra note 31, at 5
(describing a phenomenon that has no evident comparison in the United States).
317.
See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, ComparativeFinancialInstitutions: A
Survey, at 12 (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.ssrn.com (discussing how the U.S.
system may simply expose ordinary individuals to more risk); ALLEN & GALE, supra
note 19, at 442 (observing that there are significant costs to markets (i.e., volatility)
and individuals do not have the tools to deal with these costs), at 465 (identifying the
problems associated with giving people too many investment choices).
See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 19, at 469-75.
318.
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safety nets, other governance systems that are not largely based on
market capitalism may provide more protection on the downside for
investors. Though these systems may give people less upside, which
comes with their reduced exposure to risk, they might be more
319
politically stable in a significant crisis.
All this leads to the final conclusion that there is a need.to
develop a better way of debating about corporate finance and
governance. The system should be designed to lead to governance
results that promote the most overall economic wealth, given a
country's legal, political, and cultural constraints.
The goal is
particularly in line with the purpose of much psychological literature,
which is to improve policy and decision-making in different situations
by developing strategies to counteract, or at least recognize, the
influence of emotions, biases, and heuristics. 320
If legal and
regulatory policymakers become aware that they were swept along in
the psychological momentum and made the targets of psychological
influence, then they might be particularly receptive to adopting better
methods of public debate about corporate governance to address the
psychological shaping of the discussion.
Behavioral
scholars
have
called
this
"comprehensive
rationality, 321
Following this approach, corporate governance
debates and policy-making would not be based upon the model of
economic cost/benefit calculus, which pushes psychology to the
margins of consideration.32 2 Rather, the debates and policy-making
would be a method of rational debate, aware of the presence and
influence of psychological factors, and equipped with techniques to
counter or balance their effects. 323 Because the development of better
policy- and decision-making in other areas receiving much more
attention from psychological and behavioral researchers than
corporate governance is still in progress, one cannot offer firm
conclusions on the proper way to make corporate governance policy so

319.
Id. at 474.
320.
A good example is seen in the recommendations that scholars have made on
ways of countering psychological phenomena that lead groups to make poor decisions.
See JANIS, supra note 59, at 260-76. See also James N. Druckman, Using Credible
Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62 (2001) (presenting
experimental data on how individuals may resist "framing effects" in decision-making
and cautioning against a too ready acceptance of psychological handicaps of people).
Certainly, because legal academics have for a time debated differing positions on
corporate governance, they would likely favor a more comprehensive approach to
corporate governance that considered the potential of psychological factors to
undermine rational decision-making and that developed ways of blunting their force.
The psychological momentum of the dominant discourse of Anglo-American corporate
governance affected those in the legal academy, although perhaps to a lesser degree
than it did policymakers. See id.
321.
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 96, at 748.
322.
Id.
323.
See id.
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as to deal appropriately with the psychological factors.3 24 One must
also understand that the psychological factors evolved over the
millennia as adaptive ways of behaving in environments where
human beings were formed. 325 Not only were they advantageous for
survival on the African plains of our origins, but some factors, such as
over-optimism, continue to be highly adaptive. 326
Accordingly,
reforms seeking to blunt the effects of the psychological factors in any
given situation must be done with care so as not to ignore their
327
positive contribution to our ability to function in the world.
Here are a few general guidelines about how comprehensive
rationality may be created in this field. One simple and unsurprising
guideline for improving the process of the corporate governance
debate is to create awareness of the presence and influence of the
psychological factors. If, as a result of the study, policymakers see
how the Anglo-American model dominated the corporate governance
debate because of the use of myopia, availability, and anchoring by
advocates, then they may shift the debate from the assumptions of
that model as reinforced by these factors. 328 They may refuse to have
the entire agenda set by the Anglo-American model, or, if a particular
governance issue were to be considered, they may articulate other
positions or anchors as starting places for the debate, besides those
proposed by this model. For instance, the First Vi6not Report takes
this approach by offering a view of the corporation based on "social
329
interest," not exclusively on Anglo-American shareholder value.
They could blunt the force of loss aversion evoked by the Anglo-

324.
This is especially so because corporate governance itself is only a relatively
recent subject of study.
325.
See John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of
Culture, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF
CULTURE 53-55 (1992).

326.
The whole thrust of the work of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and
Cognition is to suggest that many of the psychological biases and shortcuts produce
rational results in many decision-making circumstances. See GIGERENZER ET AL.,
supra note 70, at 3-34.
327.
In a related vein, management researchers study the role of emotional
similarity or dissimilarity for effective performance in management teams. See, e.g.,
Sigal G. Barsade, To Your Heart's Content: A Model of Affective Diversity in Top
Management Teams, 45 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 802, 823 (2000) (finding that "affective
diversity" among management teams leads to their underperformance).
328.
Indeed, this is the thrust of suggestions to counter the "Groupthink"
phenomenon: to have some members of the group present a different model or scenario
of outcomes of a decision or policy. See JANIS, supra note 59, at 262-63.
329.
See 1ST VIENOT REPORT, supra note 103, at 8 ("Dans les pays anglo-saxons,
l'accent est principalement mis sur l'objectif de maximisation rapide de la valeur de
raction, alors que, sur le continent europ~en et en particulier en France, il est plut&t
mis sur l'int6r~t social de l'entreprise." In English: "In Anglo-Saxon countries, the
emphasis is mainly placed on the objective of maximizing shareholder value, while, in
Europe and particularly in France, it is instead placed on the firm's social interest.").
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American model by identifying the other "losses" arising from
3 30
adoption of this model, such as social cohesion in France.
Simple awareness of psychological factors and their operation
brings with it strategies to counter or blunt them.
Yet the
development and implementation of this kind of comprehensive
rationality in corporate governance debates will take time and
require the efforts of scholars in the diverse fields that study the
subject. It is worthwhile to ask what can help policymakers now, if
only on a provisional basis, until this form of rationality is developed.
B. A ProvisionalSolution
Before a method of comprehensive rationality on corporate
governance is developed, there is a provisional solution for
policymakers faced with aggressive corporate governance advocates
who use psychological factors. Policymakers may find "homegrown"
sources of resistance to psychological factors in politics and culture.
These sources are a mixed blessing because they may discourage
positive governance or economic changes or may favor existing elites.
Yet they may also provide policymakers with a mental framework
that blunts the immediate effects of psychological factors.
An
important practical message to policymakers on achieving a kind of
short-term comprehensive rationality is to use any available
oppositional perspectives, if only to guarantee for themselves and
33
others a space for debate on finance and governance changes. '
To state the above in another way, policymakers will naturally
view corporate governance proposals from tlheir cultural perspective.
However, rather than downplaying cultural differences in the name
of a transnational corporate governance, they should articulate or
raise these differences to help themselves resist the psychological
power of the advocacy. If, for example, policymakers were to assert
that the exclusive shareholder focus of Anglo-American corporate
governance is alien to a perspective that sees employees as a central
part of a firm, then they help reduce the advocacy's force by deflecting
its use of myopia and the availability heuristic. As a result, this
deflection may open the way for a more rational discussion of policy
changes and a more realistic view of the changes that can be effected.
There is evidence showing both the effect of psychological factors
in French corporate governance debates and the use of politics and

330.
Id.
331.
This observation borrows from the economist Deepak Lal, who argues that,
because certain cultural traditions are long-lasting and relatively resistant to
immediate change, they are fundamental to maintaining stability in a society. See
LAL, supra note 12, at 17. By contrast, he argues that techniques of economic
production can change relatively easily. See id. at 15-16.
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culture by French policymakers to blunt their force.3 3 2 Admittedly,
this argument about French cultural resistance is not surprising for
anyone familiar with France.3 3 3 In many respects French culture has
historically defined itself in opposition to Anglo-American values and
cultures. 334 This opposition has no doubt grown out of one thousand
years of political struggles between England and France, as well as
religious differences between the citizens of each country.33 5 The
evocation of French cultural and political differences is almost
automatic among the French when faced with any Anglo-American
advocacy. Since policymakers in other countries may not have this
kind of longstanding, and almost visceral defense to Anglo-American
advocacy, they may benefit from being aware of this use of culture in
French corporate governance debates.
This evidence, which is the subject of the Besson Report, is a
significant reform that made major changes to French law on
corporate governance. 336 This legal reform has been discussed and
debated for over ten years in France 33 7 and was finally enacted in
2001.338 As in any major law reform in any country, the reform can
be explained from different perspectives and attributed to numerous

332.
See documents cited supra note 103.
333.
The preceding discussion of the five corporate governance texts written by
the French can serve as evidence of French cultural resistance.
334.

See generally GLAESER & SHLEIFER, THE RISE OF THE REGULATORY STATE,

supra note 311 (discussing cultural and political differences between French and
English legal traditions). Indeed, one could use a French phrase popular in another
context: "Vive la diffdrence!"
335.
Of course, before the formation of the nation-states in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the countries' political and cultural lives were interwoven.
See Law No. 2001-420 of May 15, 2001, (Fr.), available at
336.
REGULATIONS
NOUVELLES
the
[hereinafter
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
ECONOMIQUES]. The Besson Report is an explanation of this legislation to the French
National Assembly. See BESSON REPORT, supra note 103. As Professor Wymeersch
has remarked, changes to corporate law with a corporate governance purpose are
becoming more common in European countries. See EDDY WYMEERSCH, SOME RECENT
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPANY LAW 4 (Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No.
WP 201-17, 2001), available at http://system04.rug.ac.be/flilew.html.
The reform in many ways was presaged by the proposals of Senator Marini
337.
in his Report. Senator Marini himself makes this clear in a report he authored
regarding the reform proposal for the French Senate. See RAPPORT PR]SENTt AU NOM
DE LA COMMISSION DES FINANCES, DU CONTROLE

BUDG9TAIRE

ET DES COMPTES

9CONOMIQUES DE LA NATION SUR LE PROJET DE LOI, ADOPTt PAR L'ASSEMBL9E
NATIONALE APRkS DICLARATION D'URGENCE, RELATIF AUX NOUVELLES REGULATIONS

t CONOMIQUES, PAR M. PHILIPPE MARINI 26 (5 S~nat, Session Ordinaire 2000-2001, Oct.
4, 2000) [hereinafter RAPPORT Au StNAT] ("En effet, votre rapporteur ne peut que
rappeler les termes et le contenu du rapport qu'il avait remis en 1996 au Premier
ministre et qui visait i proc~der A une modernisation du droit des socibtds" (footnote
omitted). In English: "In effect, your reporter can only call to mind the terms and
content of the report that he gave in 1996 to the Prime Minister and that was designed
to further a modernisation of company law.").
Id.
338.
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Yet, there is evidence of both the success of-the
causes.
corporate governance
Anglo-American
psychologically-powerful
advocacy, and the political and cultural resistance to it by the
French.3 39 Admittedly, this Article makes several assumptions
regarding the reform, both of which are supported by the legislative
history. First, the Article assumes that the psychological approach of
Anglo-American advocates did have an effect on corporate governance
in France, and that the use of psychology affected policymakers.
Second, the Article also assumes that, where the result of the legal
reform did not simply follow Anglo-American advocacy, it was often
due to French cultural resistance.
To support this argument, in a schematic fashion, relevant
sections of the new law can be broken down into three parts: (1) laws
clearly influenced by the corporate governance advocacy, (2) laws
exhibiting French cultural resistance to it, and (3) laws that may owe
something both to the advocacy and to the resistance. Legislative
reports, such as the Besson Report, that introduce and discuss the
3 40
legislation support this break-down.
1. Anglo-American Based Reforms
The following reforms to French corporate law were clearly
motivated by Anglo-American corporate governance advocates and
were in many cases justified in legislative reports as being a response
to them. They thus show the success of the psychologically-based
Many legal changes are designed to enhance the
advocacy.
performance and quality of the board of directors of a French public
The board is the main governance protection for
company.
and
capitalism,
market
in
Anglo-American
shareholders
improvements to its performance are the subject of much AngloAmerican corporate governance advocacy. Article 104 of the new law
addresses a complaint of corporate governance advocates that a
typical French board of directors-"conseil d'administration"-is
generally too large to be productive by reducing the statutory
maximum number of directors from twenty-four to eighteen. 341 Even
more significant is a new definition of the purpose of the French
board to supervise the overall operation and future of the firm and to
control management. 342 This was in juxtaposition with the former
definition that was identical to the role of the chief execution and that

339.

See id.

340.

See BESSON REPORT, supra note 103, at 206.

341.

See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. cOM.] arts. 225-17, -69, -95 (Fr.).

342.

NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336 (codified at C.

COM. art. 225-35).
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The reform also
thus downplayed the board's importance.3 43
encourages better French board performance-a goal of AngloAmerican advocates-by having both more formal and flexible board
practices. 344 Article 106(2) provides that a company's certificate of
incorporation should stipulate the board's meeting and deliberation
practices.3 45 Article 109 allows directors to attend meetings by videoto encourage board attendance
conference or other electronic means
3 46
and the resulting deliberations.
Prior to the reform, French law provided that the chief executive
officer-prdsident directeur ggngral or the "PDG"-of a firm who had
347
Governance
a "unitary" board had to be chairperson of the board.
that the
so
disassociated
be
to
functions
these
wanted
advocates
to
that of
power
of
source
independent
an
provide
could
chairperson
the PDG. Article 106(4) of the new law now allows a firm to separate
the supervisory-president-and management-directeur-functions,

See id. ("Le conseil d'administration d6termine les orientations de l'activit6
343.
de la soci6t6 et veille A leur mise en oeuvre. Sous r~serve des pouvoirs express~ment
attribu~s aux assemblies d'actionnaires et dans la limite de l'objet social, il se saisit de
toute question int6ressant la bonne marche de la soci~t6 et r~gle par ses d~lib6rations
les affaires qui la concernent." In English: "The board of directors determines the goals
of the company's activity and pays attention to their implementation. Within the
limitation of the powers expressly attributed to shareholder meetings and in the limit
of the company's purpose, the board considers every question dealing with the effective
operation of the company and rules through its deliberations the matters that concern
it."). The pre-reform definition asserted that both the board and the chief executive
officer "est investi des pouvoirs les plus 6tendus pour agir en toute circonstance au nom
de la societ6" ("is invested with the most extensive powers to act in every circumstance
in the name of the company"). Article 107(4) also limited the CEO's power by having it
subject to the powers of the shareholders and the board. See C. COM. art. 225-56().
Senator Marini explains that the concern to ensure that the board's power is not
limited by that of the chief executive officer is inspired by corporate governance debates
in the United States. See RAPPORT AU StNAT, supra note 337, at 295.
Article 106(1) of the NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336, also
enhances the independent ability of each board member to obtain, and verify,
information about the firm (apart from what management gives it). See C. COM. art.
225-35(1). This is designed to emphasize the individual responsibility of each board
member to inform himself or herself on the direction of the firm. See RAPPORT Au
StNAT, supra note 343, at 299.
Id.
344.
See C. COM. art. 225-36-1. According to Besson, this reform is meant to
345.
encourage the formalization of board decision-making practice that has often been too
informal and casual. See BESSON REPORT, supranote 103, at 206.
This deliberation process, however, does not apply to major decisions
346.
(election of board chairperson, appointment of CEO (i.e., the "directeur g~n~ral"),
revocation of CEO, approval of the company accounts).
See CODE DES SOCItIT s art. 113 (Dalloz 1996). The "unitary board" is the
347.
most commonly used governance structure for French companies. See C. COM. art. 225-
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or to keep them together.3 48 The board must simply explain its
349
governance structure to the market.
Yet other legal changes are designed to protect and enhance the
power of minority shareholders in a firm.
These shareholders
particularly need protection in a country like France where a firm is
generally controlled by a family or the state.3 50 Article 111 of the new
law mandates board review of "conflict of interest" transactions
between a firm and any shareholder holding more than five percent of
the firm's voting rights, or any company controlling a firm that is
such a shareholder. 351 Under prior law, this board review rule
applied only for transactions between a firm and a top executivedirecteur-or board member.3 52 Similarly, Article 114 lowers, from
ten percent to five percent, the amount of a firm's capital that a
shareholder, or group of shareholders, must hold to exercise certain
rights-namely, to call a shareholders' meeting if the board has not
done so and to ask the board questions about the firm's operations
that legally require a response from the company. 353 As in the case of
the boards of directors, the new law seeks to facilitate shareholder
attendance at meetings by permitting a firm's certificate of
incorporation to provide that shareholders can attend meetings by
354
video-conference or by other means of telecommunications.
The best example of the Anglo-American corporate governance
advocacy's success is how the new law specifically enhances voting by
foreign shareholders like Calpers.3 55 Article 119 of the new law

348.
See C. Com. art. 225.51-1 ("La direction g6n~rale de la soci6t6 est assum~e,
sous sa responsabilit6, soit par le pr6sident du conseil d'administration, soit par une
autre personne physique nomm6e par le conseil d'administration et portant le titre de
directeur g~n~ral." In English: "The management of a corporation is assumed, under
his responsibility, either by the chairperson of the board of directors, or by another
natural person nominated by the board and having the title of directeurgdndral.").
349.
On the import of this separation and its significance in the history of
French corporate law, see Conac, supra note 101, at 4-7 (explaining that this model is
actually a return to the board structure in the years before the Vichy government (i.e.,
French government that collaborated with the German occupiers in World War II)).
350.
See sources cited supra note 111.
351.
See C. COM. arts. 225-38.
352.
Id.
353.
See C. COM. arts. 103 (shareholders' meeting), 231 (right to pose questions).
In his Report, Besson remarks that this reform is aimed at increasing the power of
individual shareholders in France, a reform that is necessary because of recent
scandals involving small shareholders abused by controlling shareholders. See BESSON
REPORT, supra note 103, at 239-44.
354.
NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336, art. 115 (codified
at C. COM. art. 225.107(11)). The provision leaves the French State to specify what
telecommunications methods would be acceptable, so that it is unclear what form of
shareholder participation will result from the change.
See EDDY WYMEERSCH,
CURRENT COMPANY LAW REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE OECD COUNTRIES: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES 18 (Fin. Law Inst., Working Paper No. WP 2001-04), available at
http://system04.rug.ac.be/fli/ew.html.
355.
See CALPERS PRINCIPLES, supra note 104.
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allows a French financial intermediary to hold shares for non-French
owners collectively in the intermediary's name and for these owners
to exercise their right to vote through the intermediary. 35 6 The same
Article requires intermediaries to identify foreign shareholders as a
condition to exercising the voting right. 357 There is, accordingly, no
need for a foreign shareholder to attend shareholder meetings
personally to exercise its franchise, which adds to the voting power of
ss
Anglo-American shareholders in French companies.3
2. Reforms Exhibiting, and Resulting from, Political and Cultural
Resistance
Other provisions of the new law are primarily based on French
culture and politics that resist Anglo-American corporate governance
advocacy. 35 9 These perspectives support a form of capitalism that
accepts government intervention in markets and regards
stakeholders other than shareholders as important participants in
corporate governance. 360 A prominent new example is the law
requiring that a party launching a tender offer consult with the
workers' committee of the targeted firm.3 61 In contrast, a tender offer
under a "purer" market capitalist system would legally have to be
addressed solely to the shareholders of the target firm.3 62 An
amendment to the French Labor Code requires the consultation; if
the party making the offer fails to comply with this requirement, it
cannot exercise its voting rights in the target firm until it meets with
the workers' committee.3 63 In addition, the committee has the right

356.
See C. COM. arts. 225-107-1, 228-1.
Under the former legal system,
intermediaries could hold the shares, but no legal provision allowed the intermediaries
to vote the shares for the beneficial owners. See RAPPORT AU StNAT, supra note 337, at
361-63.
357.
See C. COM. art. 228-3-2.
358.
Yet the identification of foreign shareholders may adversely affect how
foreign shareholders vote, if the latter are concerned that company management may
"punish" identifiable opponents. On the other hand, firms would want this right to
identify shareholders because they are concerned about being able to identify potential
takeover bidders that may be foreign parties.
359.
See FANTO, supra note 1.
360.
See id.
361.
Workers' committees are so required under French statutes. See generally CODE
DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] art. 431-1, availableat http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
,362.
This is clearly an issue of degree, for some U.S. state corporate statutes
allow a board of directors of a target firm to consider the interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders in the exercise of their duties, including when considering how to
respond to a tender offer. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (Gould 2000).
363.

See NOUVELLES

REGULATIONS

ECONOMIQUES,

supra note

342,

art. 4

(Rbgulation financibre, Titre ler) (codified at C. TRAV. art. 432-1). In effect, before the
reform, a CEO of a target firm had to notify the committee of the offer, and the
committee could invite the bidder to appear before it. However, there was no
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to announce whether it considers the offer hostile to the firm's
employees. 3 64 An adverse position on the committee's part cannot
legally stop the bid, but it may generate negative publicity that could
spur government intervention in the takeover. 365 An addition to the
same Code empowers employees to select a representative who can
call a shareholders' meeting in case of an urgent need and propose
resolutions to that meeting, as well as designate workers'
366
representatives to attend shareholders' meetings.
3. Reforms with Dual Origins
Some provisions of the new law owe their origin to both AngloAmerican corporate governance advocacy and to French politics and
culture. This category is in many ways the one that most reflects
reality because law reforms cannot often or easily be traced to one
cause as they are due to multiple causes. The new law, for example,
now requires disclosure of shareholder agreements involving 0.5% of
shares or votes of a listed French company.3 6 7 The new. law also
mandates that any sale or acquisition of shares of a firm that is the
object of a tender offer must occur on a recognized securities market

requirement that the bidder appear or that the committee pronounce on the offer. See
RAPPORT AU SItNAT, supra note 337, at 50. Indeed, Marini points out that the former
provision was used only once because, in France, bidders usually visited committees
voluntarily. Id. at 51.
364.
Id.
365.
This ability of the workers' committee to characterize the offer as "hostile"
was the subject of controversy in the legislative debates. Senator Marini pointed out
that what could be hostile to one party could be favorable to others (e.g., shareholders)
and that the consulting procedure could become a kind of poison pill defense for
management. See RAPPORT AU StINAT, supra note 337, at 57-58.
See NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336, art. 99
366.
(Regulation de l'entreprise, Titre ler) (codified at C. TRAV. art. 432-6-1). Senator
Marini opposed this reform since it puts the workers' committee on the same level as
the shareholders and because the committee already has significant consulting powers.
See RAPPORT AU StNAT, supra note 337, at 284-86.
The form of capitalism that this law suggests is not without its limits. The French
Conseil Constitutionel recently struck down, on the ground that it established the
wrong balance between the right to undertake a business and the right to work, a
definition of "economic layoff' (licencement 6conomique) added to the Code du Travail
by a recent French law, which was designed to penalize employers by restricting the
situations in which they could lay off employees for economic reasons without incurring
a penalty. See Decision No. 2001-455 DC of Jan. 12, 2002, (Fr.) (Loi de modernisation
sociale)
43-50. The Conseil also noted that vague definitions of what would constitute
an economic layoff (e.g., "difficult6s s6rieu'ses n'ayant pu 6tre surmont~es par tout autre
moyen") would improperly require judges to substitute their judgment for that of executives.
On the functioning of the Conseil, in juxtaposition to other constitutional courts, see
RAPHAEL LA PORTA, THE GUARANTEES OF FREEDOM 12 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8759, 2002), availableat http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8759.pdf.
367.
Id.
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and not off-market. 368 The new law enhances transparency and
disclosure, and thus market capitalism, for it is designed to help
reduce-the power of large, controlling shareholders. 369 In addition,
the law can make takeovers more difficult and expensive by alerting
firms
firms and the French State to potential bidders and can37protect
0
market.
the
by
control
corporate
from
workers
their
and
As another example of the potential dual origin of provisions of
the new law, the number of management and director positions that
any board member can have at one time has been reduced. 371 The
reform clearly originates from the Anglo-American governance
concern of making board members pay more attention to their work
by not dispersing their efforts over too many companies. 372 Yet the
law can also be seen as addressing the excessive elitism in French
board membership, which keeps it within a small group of French
373
society.
A final but significant example of the multiple causes for legal
change is the new law requiring disclosure of individual
374
compensation of officers and directors, each mandataire social.
This contrasts with the former disclosure regime and with existing
disclosure schemes in many other European countries that required
disclosure only of the total amounts a company paid to all major

See NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336, arts. 1, 2
368.
(Rdgulation financi~re, Titre ler) (codified at C. COM. art. 233-11, and at CODE
MONtTIER ET FINANCIER art. 421-12). This law was specifically addressing the
transactions between Soci6t6 G6n~rale/Paribas/BNP in 1999 where secret shareholding
agreements surfaced and where transactions occurred off the organized market. See
generally RAPPORTAU StNAT, supra note 337, at 42-47.
See id.
369.
370.
See id.
In French, this is the subject of the "cumul des mandats." Article 110 of the
371.
NOUVELLES RGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, Regulation de 'entreprise, reduces from
eight to five the number of director positions that any one person can occupy. C. COM.
art. 225-21 (including positions in companies controlled by a firm in which the person
is a director, unless the subsidiary is unlisted). Similarly, a person can hold only one
executive position (i.e., directeur gdngral) except in controlled companies'
See C. COM. art. 225-54-1. Similarly, in general and with some
circumstances.
exceptions, the law limits to five the total number of directorships and executive
positions any one person may have. C. CoM. art. 225-94-1.
Indeed, Senator Marini justifies this reform in explicit corporate
372.
governance terms, with reference to Anglo-American corporate governance debates and
to enhancement of board behavior. See RAPPORT AU S9NAT, supra note 337, at 320.
See BESSON REPORT, supranote 103, at 226.
373.
See NOUVELLES REGULATIONS ECONOMIQUES, supra note 336, art. 116
374.
(R6gulation de rentreprise, Titre ler) (codified at C. COM. art. 225-102-1 (including
compensation from work in controlled companies)). The disclosure here also requires
information about any positions that officers and directors have in the firm in question
and in any other firm.
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executives and board members. 375 The law has clearly been
motivated by the goal of better monitoring compensation of the
primary corporate agents. 376 This kind of monitoring has, for a long
time, been one of the major goals of activism by Anglo-American
corporate governance advocates, who feel that corporate agents
cannot be appropriately controlled if their compensation is
inadequately disclosed. 377 In France, however, this new kind of
disclosure also originates from a proper French attempt to reduce the
power of French business and political elites who often hide their
3 78
compensation and its sources for political and tax reasons.
The above schematic account of parts of a recent French legal
reform is not meant to trace the full origins of any particular
provision of the new law. It provides evidence, however, that the
powerful Anglo-American corporate governance advocacy, which has
been present in French business and legal circles for at least ten
years, ultimately had an effect upon French law. It equally suggests
that this advocacy met resistance based on French culture and
politics that oppose unqualified acceptance of Anglo-American market
capitalism. In the face of a dominant discourse, French policymakers
may take comfort in this result. They can use the traditions
strategically in a similar manner in the future, so as to provide
themselves with a space in which to conduct the necessary debates.
There will be a built-in resistance to psychologically powerful
advocacy as French policymakers adjust their governance system to
current economic and business realities and as they develop a better
system of conducting corporate governance debates.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article contends that in the 1990s Anglo-American
corporate governance became the dominant model of corporate
governance rules for large, public firms in international business.
The Article also asserts that corporate governance professionals
relentlessly promoted Anglo-American corporate governance
throughout the developed and developing world. Current political
and economic circumstances have made it an appropriate time to
examine critically this advocacy and, in particular, to explain the

375.
The former disclosure regime did not require a breakdown for individual
compensation. See id.
376.
See id.
377.
It is in these corporate governance terms that Senator Marini explains the
reform. See RAPPORT AU StNAT, supra note 337, at 354.
378.
Perhaps the best recent example of this characteristic among the French
elite is President Chirac's refusal to disclose the source and use of presidential funds.
See supra note 150.
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momentum and persuasiveness of the dominant model. This Article's
primary contention is that corporate governance advocates used
psychological factors to create this momentum in many countries and
to persuade policymakers abroad to use Anglo-American corporate
governance as a model to transform their governance systems.
Consequently, psychological factors made the corporate governance
debate purely one-sided.
This hypothesis is supported by a review of the use of
psychological factors in major French and non-French corporate
governance advocacy texts that had an influence in France. This
study revealed an extensive use of the psychological factors. From
these results I drew several conclusions. In particular, the use of
psychological factors to promote Anglo-American corporate
governance shows that French debates over a governance model were
quasi-rational as much as rational. This characterization of the
debates also suggests that the best outcome was not necessarily
Most
promoted or attained in -French corporate governance.
about
and
analyzing
corporate
importantly, ways of debating
governance should be developed with a view toward helping
policymakers resist, or at least better handle, psychological factors
used by the advocates. As in the case of many psychologically-based
studies, this study urges that there be ongoing efforts to recognize the
use of psychological factors and to create a form of deliberation that
takes into account how psychological -factors affect the rationality of
any debate.
On a positive note, the examination of Anglo-American corporate
governance advocacy in France also suggests that culture and politics
may help policymakers resist the momentum generated by the
psychological factors. This aid may especially be important in current
circumstances before a comprehensive rationality is developed in
Like corporate governance advocacy itself, these
some form.
traditions should not be used without reflection, because they may be
invoked to close down discussions and to prevent a necessary reform
to a country's corporate governance. Yet if employed with care by
policymakers, they may not only point to aspects of a country's
corporate governance that cannot easily be altered, because they are
so ingrained in encompassingbelief systems, but may also provide a
natural source of resistance to the psychologically-driven momentum
of corporate governance advocacy. This Article proposes that politics
and culture become not the ultimate arbiter of what can or cannot be
achieved in a country's corporate governance, but one available
guarantee of a rationaldebate about corporate governance reform.

